


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RATIONAL POLICY, ORGANIZATION PROCESS, AND BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS

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CONCEPTUAL MODELS AND THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS:
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When one is puzzled by a happening in foreign affairs, the pinch of his puzzlement is typically a particular outcome: the Soviet emplacement of missiles in Cuba, the movement of U.S. troops across the narrow neck of the Korean peninsula, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. These occurrences force the analyst to formulate questions: Why did the Soviet Union place missiles in Cuba? Why did U.S. troops fail to stop at the narrow neck in their march up the Korean peninsula? Why did Japan attack the United States at Pearl Harbor? In pursuing these questions, what the serious analyst seeks to discover is why one specific state of the world came to be the case -- rather than some other. These "why" questions seek explanations.

Faced with a demand for explanation, most analysts proceed by showing how the nation's action constituted a reasonable choice, given rational objectives. Thus, missile construction in Cuba is explained as a Soviet probe of American intentions. U.S. troops marched across the narrow neck in Korea, according to standard accounts, because American objectives had escalated as a consequence of easy victories in the South. The attack on Pearl Harbor is explained as Japan's solution to the strategic problem posed by U.S. pressure in the Far East.

What these explanations assume is that occurrences can be most satisfactorily understood as purposive acts of national governments, conceived as unitary, rational agents. For many purposes, this is a fruitful assumption. Summary of the varied activities of representatives of a national government as the acts of nations transforms unwieldy complexity into manageable packages. Treating nations as if they were rational individuals provides a productive shorthand for understanding problems of policy. But this assumption -- like all assumptions -- obscures as well as reveals. What this assumption

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obscures is a frequently neglected fact: the maker of governmental policy is not a rational, unitary decisionmaker but rather a conglomerate of large organizations and political actors. To explore the implications of this fact for the activities of foreign policy analysts is the purpose of this exercise.

The general argument of the essay can be stated in three propositions.

1. Specialists in foreign policy and policy makers, as well as plain men reading the New York Times, think about problems of foreign policy in terms of implicit conceptual models which have significant consequences for the character of their thought.

Explanations aimed at relieving puzzlement like that surrounding Soviet missiles in Cuba or the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor constitute a considerable part of the intellectual product of foreign policy analysts. At present, this product is neither elegant nor powerful. The discursive, non-cumulative, almost casual character of this work has become a commonplace. Nevertheless, in response to puzzles, explanations are produced. Careful inspection of these explanations reveals a number of underlying clusters of fundamental similarity. Explanations produced by particular analysts display quite regular and predictable attributes. This predictability suggests an underlying substructure. The first proposition of this essay is that these regularities reflect frames of reference or conceptual models with which analysts approach problems of foreign policy.* These conceptual models both fix the mesh of the nets which the analyst drags through the material in order to explain a particular action or decision, and direct him to cast his nets in select ponds, at certain depths, in order to catch the fish he is after.

2. One conceptual model so pervades the literature of foreign affairs, diplomatic history, and international relations, as well as the normal reactions of plain men, that it may be said to constitute the standard frame of reference. In confronting the problem posed by the construction of Soviet missiles in Cuba, most analysts employ -- albeit implicitly -- this model which (1) frames the puzzlement: why did the Soviet Union decide to place missiles in Cuba? (2) fixes the unit of analysis: national choice; (3) focuses attention on certain concepts: goals and objectives of the nation; and (4) invokes certain patterns of inference: if the nation performed an act of that sort, it must have had a goal of this type. Explanation of the occurrence, according to this model, consists in showing how placing missiles in Cuba was a reasonable choice from the point of view of the Soviet Union, given Soviet strategic objectives.

* In arguing that explanations proceed in terms of implicit conceptual models, this essay makes no claim that scholars of foreign policy have developed any satisfactory theoretical models. In this essay, the use of the term "model" without qualifiers should be read "conceptual model."

3. Two alternative conceptual models offer considerable additional power for understanding happenings of international politics.

Although the standard frame of reference has proved useful for many purposes, it is now clear that this model must be supplemented, if not supplanted, by frames of reference which focus upon the detailed functioning and malfunctioning of organizations and individuals in the policy process. The standard framework's implication that important events have important causes, i.e., that monoliths perform large actions for big reasons must be balanced by an appreciation of the fact that monoliths are black boxes covering various gears and levers in a highly differentiated decisionmaking structure; large acts, reifications of innumerable and not always constructive or efficient actions by small bureaucrats; done not for the big reason but rather in the service of a variety only partially compatible conceptions of national goals, organizational goals, and political objectives.

Recent developments in the field of organization theory provide the foundation for the second model. According to Model II, what the rational policy model analyst categorizes as "acts" and "choices" are instead outputs of large organizations functioning according to standard patterns of behavior. Faced with the problem of Soviet missiles in Cuba, Model II (1) frames the puzzlement: what outputs of which organizations produced which elements of this aggregate happening? (2) fixes the unit of analysis: organizational output; (3) focuses attention on certain concepts: the standard operating procedures and repertoires of organizations; and (4) invokes certain patterns of inference: if organizations produced output "X" today, they must have had procedures and repertoires for producing an output of that sort yesterday. Explanation of the occurrence, according to Model II, consists in identifying the relevant Soviet organizations and displaying the patterns of organizational behavior from which the action emerged.

A third model, implicit in the work of a small but growing group of analysts, focuses on the internal politics of a government. Happenings in foreign affairs are understood according to Model III, neither as choices nor as outputs. Rather, what happens is categorized as outcomes of various overlapping bargaining games among players arranged hierarchically in the national government. In confronting the problem posed by Soviet missiles in Cuba, Model III (1) frames the puzzlement: what outcomes of which bargaining among whom yielded the critical decisions that resulted in this behavior? (2) fixes the unit of analysis: political outcome; (3) focuses attention on certain concepts: the games, power, and maneuvers of players; and (4) invokes certain patterns of inference: if a nation performed an action, that action was the outcome of bargaining among players in a central game. Explanation of this happening, according to Model III, displays the games, power, and maneuvers of principal players and the understandings and misunderstandings from which the outcome emerged.

A central metaphor illuminates differences among these "alternative models." Foreign policy has often been compared to moves,

sequences of moves, and games of chess. If one were limited to observations on a screen upon which moves in the chess game were registered without information as to how the pieces came to be moved, he would assume -- as the standard model does -- that an individual chess player was moving the pieces in terms of strategic plans and tactical maneuvers toward a single goal, namely, winning the game. But a pattern of moves can be imagined which would lead the serious observer, after watching several games, to consider the hypothesis that the chess player was not a single individual but rather a loose alliance of semi-independent organizations, each of which moved its set of pieces according to standard operating procedures. For example, movement of separate sets of pieces might proceed in turn, each according to a routine, the king's rook, bishop, and their pawns repeatedly attacking the opponent according to a fixed plan. Furthermore, it is conceivable that the pattern of play would suggest to the imaginative observer that a number of distinct players, with separate goals and objectives but shared power over the pieces, were determining moves as the consequences of collegial bargaining. For example, the movement of the black rook might contribute to the loss of a black knight with no comparable gain for the black team, but with the consequence that the black rook became the principal guardian of the "palace" on that side of the board.

The limits of this essay do not permit adequate development and support of such general arguments.* In attempting to understand problems of foreign affairs, analysts engage in a number of logically separable enterprises: description, explanation, prediction, evaluation, and recommendation. This essay develops the argument with specific reference to one principal, and logically prior, activity of my primary audience: explanations produced by serious analysts. Analogues of these conceptual models are employed by analysts of various areas of governmental policy. Attention in this essay is restricted exclusively to foreign affairs. The spectrum of substantive areas in foreign affairs is quite broad. Here the models are applied to produce explanations of a single occurrence: one central puzzle of the Cuban missile crisis. A crisis decision, by a small group of men in the context of ultimate threat to the nation, this is a case of the rational policy model par excellence. The dimensions and factors which Models II and III uncover in this case are therefore particularly suggestive of the character of work produced by these styles of analysis.

Within these limits, the general argument is developed by three sections each of which sketches a conceptual model and articulates it as a paradigm. Furthermore, each section includes a "case snapshot" which displays the work of the conceptual models as each is applied in turn to the same problem: the U.S. blockade of Cuba during the Cuban missile crisis. These alternative explanations of the same happening illustrate differences among the conceptual models -- at work. The concluding section generates predictions in terms of each of the models and suggests how the three conceptual models may be related.

* These arguments are developed and supported in the author's forthcoming Bureaucracy and Policy: Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis.

II. MODEL I: RATIONAL POLICY

Where is the pinch of the puzzle raised by the New York Times over Soviet deployment of an anti-ballistic missile system? [1] The question, as the Times states it, concerns the Soviet Union's objective in allocating such large sums of money for this weapon system while at the same time seeming to pursue a policy of increasing detente. In the President's words, "the paradox is that this [Soviet deployment of an anti-ballistic missile system] should be happening at a time when there is abundant evidence that our mutual antagonism is beginning to ease." [2] This question troubles specialists in international politics and plain men reading the Establishment daily, as well as the President, primarily because the two sets of phenomena: Soviet anti-ballistic missile deployment, and evidence of Soviet actions towards detente, when slotted in our implicit model, produce a question. What objective could the Soviet Union possibly have towards which the simultaneous pursuit of these two courses of actions constitutes a rational choice? This question arises only when the analyst brings to the phenomena a frame of reference which conceptualizes occurrences as purposive choices of consistent, unitary actors.

Confronted by the problem of the construction of Soviet missiles in Cuba in October, 1962, how do analysts proceed? The most widely acclaimed explanation of this occurrence has been produced by two eminent RAND Sovietologists. [3] Arnold Horelick and Myron Rush tailor the problem as a question: why did the Soviet Union decide to place offensive missiles in Cuba? Then, in Sherlock Holmes style, they proceed to test each possible objective which the Soviets might have had against all available information concerning the details of Soviet behavior. For example, the objective of probing American intentions is considered but rejected because of its incompatibility with the fact that the Soviets were installing more expensive, more visible Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBM's) as well as Medium Range Ballistic Missiles (MRBM's). Horelick and Rush's explanation presents an argument for one objective which allows interpretation of the various details of Soviet behavior as a value-maximizing choice.

What caused the first World War? According to Hans Morgenthau, "the first World War had its origin exclusively in the fear of a disturbance of the European balance of power." [4] In the period preceding World War I, the Triple Alliance (Austria, Germany, and Italy) precariously balanced the Triple Entente (France, Russia, and Great Britain). If either power combination could gain a decisive advantage in the Balkans, it would achieve a decisive advantage in the overall European balance of power. "It was this fear," Morgenthau asserts, "that motivated Austria in July 1914 to try to settle its accounts with Serbia once and for all, and that induced Germany to support Austria

unconditionally. It was the same fear that brought Russia to the support of Serbia, and France to the support of Russia.[5] How is Morgenthau able to resolve this problem so confidently? By imposing on the data a "rational outline." [6] The value of this method, according to Morgenthau, is that "it provides for rational discipline in action and creates astounding continuity in foreign policy which makes American, British, or Russian foreign policy appear as an intelligent, rational continuum. . . regardless of the different motives, preferences, and intellectual and moral qualities of successive statesmen." [7]

Stanley Hoffmann's essay, "Restraints and Choices in American Foreign Policy" concentrates, characteristically, on "deep forces": the international system, ideology, and national character -- which constitute restraints, limits, and blinders.[8] Only secondarily does he consider decisions. When explaining particular occurrences, nevertheless, though emphasizing relevant constraints, he focuses on the choices of nations. American behavior in Southeast Asia is explained as a reasonable choice of "downgrading this particular alliance (SEATO) in favor of direct U.S. involvement," given the constraint: "one is bound by one's commitments; one is committed by one's mistakes." [9] More frequently, Hoffmann uncovers confusion or contradiction in the nation's choice. For example, U.S. policy towards underdeveloped countries is explained as "schizophrenic." [10] The method Hoffmann employs in producing these explanations as rational (or irrational) decisions, he terms "imaginative reconstruction." [11]

Deterrence is the cardinal problem of the contemporary strategic literature. Thomas Schelling's Strategy of Conflict formulates a number of propositions which explain the dynamics of deterrence in the nuclear age. One of the major propositions concerns the stability of the balance of terror: in a situation of mutual deterrence, the probability of nuclear war is reduced not by the "balance" -- the sheer equality of the situation -- but rather by the stability of the balance, i.e., the fact that neither opponent in striking first can destroy the other's ability to strike back. [12] How does Schelling support this proposition? Confidence in the contention stems not from an inductive canvass of a large number of previous cases, but rather from two calculations. In a situation of "balance" but vulnerability, there are values for which a rational opponent could choose to strike first, e.g. to destroy enemy capabilities to retaliate. In a "stable balance" where no matter who strikes first, each has an assured second strike capability for unacceptable damage, no rational agent could choose such a course of action (since that choice is effectively equivalent to choosing mutual homicide). Whereas most contemporary strategic thinking is driven implicitly by the motor upon which this calculation depends, Schelling explicitly recognizes that strategic theory does assume a model. The foundation of a theory of strategy is, he asserts: "the assumption of rational behavior -- not just of intelligent behavior, but of behavior motivated by conscious calculation of advantages, calculation that in turn is based on an explicit and internally consistent value system." [13]

What is striking about these examples from the literature of foreign policy and international relations are the similarities among analysts of various stripes when they are called upon to produce explanations. Each assumes that what must be explained is an action, i.e., the realization of some purpose or intention. Each assumes that the actor is the nation. Each assumes that the action is chosen as a calculated response to a strategic problem. For each, explanation consists of showing what goal the nation was pursuing in committing the act and how this action was a reasonable choice, given the nation's objective. This set of assumptions constitutes the frame of reference which is here labeled the rational policy model.*

Most contemporary analysts (as well as plain men) proceed predominantly -- albeit implicitly -- in terms of this conceptual model when attempting to explain happenings in foreign affairs. Indeed, that occurrences in foreign affairs are the acts of nations seems so fundamental to thinking about foreign affairs that this conceptual model has rarely been recognized. To explain an occurrence in foreign policy, so the prevailing consensus maintains, simply means to show how the nation could have rationally chosen that action. These brief illustrations from several areas of the literature amount to no argument by innumeration. Rather, this essay attempts to convey a grasp of the model which will permit the reader to uncover numerous other examples from the literature with which he is most familiar.

To assert that Model I is the standard frame of reference is not to deny highly visible differences among the interests of Sovietologists, diplomatic historians, international relations theorists, and strategists. Indeed, in most respects, differences among the work of Hans Morgenthau, Stanley Hoffmann, and Thomas Schelling could not be more salient. Appreciation of the extent to which each relies predominantly on Model I, however, reveals basic similarities among Morgenthau's method of "rational reenactment,"[14] Hoffmann's "imaginative reconstruction,"[15] and Schelling's "vicarious problem solving";[16] family resemblances among Morgenthau's "rational statesman,"[17] Hoffman's "roulette player,"[18] and Schelling's "game theorist." [19]

This general characterization of Model I can be sharpened by articulating the rational policy model as an "analytic paradigm" in the technical sense of this term developed by Robert K. Merton for characterizing sociological analyses.[20] Systematic statement of basic assumptions, concepts, and propositions employed by Model I analysts emphasizes the distinctive thrust of this style of analysis. The literature of contemporary strategy employs the most refined version of the conceptual model. Thus the paradigm is articulated for the strategic variant. Other variants, which can be characterized by modifying the basic paradigm, are noted.

* Earlier drafts of this essay have aroused heated arguments concerning a proper name for this model. Suggested candidates include the "rational actor," "reified rational," and "unitary purposive." To choose a name from ordinary language is to court confusion, as well as familiarity. Perhaps it is best to think of this frame of reference as Model I. But, lest it go nameless, it is labeled the rational policy model.

RATIONAL POLICY PARADIGM

I. Basic Unit of Analysis: Policy as National Choice

Happenings in foreign affairs are conceived as actions chosen by the nation. Nations choose actions after calculations concerning value-maximizing means for achieving strategic goals and objectives. These "solutions" to strategic problems are the fundamental categories in terms of which the analyst perceives what is to be explained. Moves in the chess game are explained as rational choices of a single player.

II. Focal Concepts

1. National Actor. The nation, conceived as a rational, unitary decisionmaker, is the agent. The nation has one set of specified goals (the equivalent of a single utility function), one set of perceived alternatives, and a single estimate of the consequences that follow from each alternative.

2. The Problem. Action is chosen in response to the strategic problem which faces the nation. Threats and opportunities arising in the "international strategic market place" move the nation to act.

3. Static Selection. The sum of activity of representatives of the government relevant to a strategic problem constitutes what the nation has chosen as its "solution." Thus the action is conceived as a steady-state choice among alternative outcomes (rather than, for example, a large number of partial choices in a dynamic stream).

4. Action as Rational Choice. Action results from national choice among alternatives of a means calculated to achieve strategic objectives. As such, its components include:

(A) Goals and Objectives. National security and national interests are the principal categories in which strategic goals are conceived. Nations seek security and a range of further objectives. Analysts rarely translate strategic goals and objectives into an explicit utility function; nevertheless, analysts do focus on major goals and objectives and trade off side effects in an intuitive fashion.

(B) Alternatives. Various courses of action relevant to a strategic problem provide the spectrum of alternatives.

(C) Consequences. Enactment of each alternative course of action will produce a series of consequences. The relevant consequences constitute advantages and disadvantages in terms of strategic goals and objectives.

(D) Choice. Rational choice is value-maximizing. The rational agent selects the alternative whose consequences rank highest in terms of his goals and objectives.*

*The rational policy model is employed in several variants. The point of each is to place an action within a value-maximizing framework,

III. Dominant Inference Pattern

Employment of this paradigm leads analysts to rely on a range of loosely formulated propositions in producing explanations. The most general of these is the dominant inference pattern. If a nation performed a particular action, that nation must have had goals and objectives towards which the action constituted a value-maximizing means. The nation's objectives can be discovered by calculating what strategic values are maximized by the action performed. The rational policy model's explanatory power stems from this inference pattern. Puzzlement is relieved by revealing the purposive pattern within which the occurrence can be located as a value-maximizing means.

IV. General Propositions

The disgrace of political science is the infrequency with which it formulates and tests non-trivial propositions of any generality. Paradigmatic analysis argues for consciousness concerning the terms in which analysis proceeds, and seriousness about the logic of explanation. Explanations entail propositions.[21] Simply to illustrate the kind of propositions on which analysts who employ this model rely, the paradigm includes several.

The basic assumption of value-maximizing behavior produces propositions central to explanations in most contexts. The general principle can be formulated as follows: the probability of any particular action results from a combination of the nation's (1) relevant values and objectives, (2) perceived alternative courses of action, (3) probability estimates of various sets of consequences (which will follow from each alternative), and (4) valuation of each set of consequences. This yields two propositions.

1. An increase in the cost of an alternative, i.e., a reduction in the value of the set of consequences which will follow from that action, or a reduction in the probability of attaining fixed consequences, reduces the probability of that alternative being chosen.

2. A decrease in the costs of an alternative, i.e., an increase in the value of the set of consequences which will follow from that alternative, or an increase in the probability of attaining fixed consequences, increases the probability of that action being chosen.*

given certain constraints. But most variants constrain the focal concepts stated in the strategic paradigm. Thus national propensities or personality traits reflected in an "operational code," concern with certain objectives, or special principles of action narrow the "goals," "alternatives," or "consequences" considered. A further variant, employed often by Hoffmann and by George Kennan, explains government action as deviation from the norm of rational choice.

* This model is an analogue of the theory of the rational entrepreneur which has been developed extensively in economic theories of the firm and the consumer. These two propositions specify the "substitution effect." Refinement of this model and specifications of additional general propositions by translating from the economic theory is straightforward.

V. Specific Propositions

1. Deterrence. The probability of any particular attack results from the factors specified in the general principle: (1) relevant values and objectives, (2) perceived alternative courses of action, (3) probability estimates of various sets of consequences (which will follow from each alternative), and (4) valuation of each set of consequences. Combined with various factual assertions, this general proposition yields the assortment of propositions which constitute the sub-theory of deterrence.

(A) A stable nuclear balance reduces the probability of nuclear attack. This proposition is derived from the general proposition plus the asserted fact that a second-strike capability affects the potential attacker's calculus by increasing both the probability and the costs of one particular set of consequences which might follow from attack -- namely retaliation.

(B) Second-strike capabilities reduce the probability of escalation from the accidental firing of a missile to a full-blown nuclear exchange. This proposition is derived from the general proposition plus the asserted fact that mutual second-strike capabilities increase (3) and reduce (4) for a particular set of consequences.

(C) A stable nuclear balance increases the probability of limited war. This proposition is derived from the general proposition plus the asserted fact that though increasing the costs of a nuclear exchange, a stable nuclear balance nevertheless produces a more significant reduction in the probability that such consequences would be chosen in response to a limited war. Thus this set of consequences weighs less heavily in the calculus.

2. Sovietology. Particular Soviet actions are chosen as the result of calculations according to the general principle.

(A) Force Posture. The Soviet Union chooses its force posture (i.e., its weapons and their deployment) as a value-maximizing means of implementing Soviet strategic objectives and doctrine. Relying on this proposition, H. S. Dinerstein explains the Soviet force posture of the 1950's as rational implementation of Soviet military objectives.[22]

VI. Evidence

The fundamental analytic device employed in rational policy model analysis is what Schelling has called "vicarious problem solving." Faced with a puzzling occurrence, the analyst puts himself in the place of the nation. Examination of the strategic characteristics of the problem permits the analyst to use principles of rational action to sift through both commission and omissions. Evidence about the details of behavior, statements of government officials, and government papers is then marshalled to present a coherent picture of the purposive choice from the point of view of the nation which had to act.

The power of this conceptual model can be demonstrated, and the character of explanations produced when employing it displayed, by addressing a central happening of the Cuban missile crisis in terms of Model I.

WHY DID THE UNITED STATES CHOOSE TO RESPOND TO THE SOVIET MISSILE DEPLOYMENT WITH A BLOCKAGE OF CUBA?*

The U.S. response to the Soviet Union's emplacement of missiles in Cuba must be understood in strategic terms as simple value-maximizing escalation. American nuclear superiority could be counted on to immobilize Soviet nuclear power; Soviet transgression of the nuclear threshold in response to an American use of lower levels of violence would be wildly irrational since it would mean virtual destruction of the Soviet Communist system and Russian nation. American local superiority was so overwhelming that it could be initiated at a low level while threatening with high credibility an ascending sequence of steps short of the nuclear threshold. All that was required was for the United States to bring to bear its strategic and local superiority in such a way that American determination to see the missile removed would be demonstrated, while at the same time allowing Moscow time and room to retreat without humiliation. The naval blockade -- or quarantine, as it was called in order to circumvent the niceties of international law -- did just that.

The U.S. government's selection of the blockade after weighing all available alternatives followed this logic. Apprised of the presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba, the President assembled an Executive Committee (ExCom) of the National Security Council and directed them to "set aside all other tasks to make a prompt and intense survey of the dangers and all possible courses of action." [23] This group functioned as "fifteen individuals on our own, representing the President and not different departments." [24] As one of the participants recalls, "the remarkable aspect of those meetings was a sense of complete equality. Protocol mattered little when the nation's life was at stake. Experience mattered little in a crisis which had no precedent. Even rank mattered little when secrecy prevented staff support." [25] Most of the time during the week that followed was spent canvassing all the possible tracks and weighing the arguments for and against each. Six major categories of action were considered.

1. Do nothing. The United States had long lived within the range of Soviet missiles. The Soviet Union had long been subjected to a nuclear threat both from bases within the United States and from bases less than 90 miles from her border. Thus the real danger was that the United States would over-react to this Soviet move. The Soviet action should be announced by the United States in a casual and calm manner, thereby deflating whatever political capital Khrushchev hoped to make of the missiles.

* The prevailing explanations of this phenomenon (T. Sorensen, Kennedy; A. Schlesinger, A Thousand Days; A. and R. Wohlstetter, "Controlling the Risks," Adelphi Paper, London, 1965; A. Horelick, "The Cuban Missile Crisis," World Politics, (April, 1964) proceed in terms of the standard frame of reference. This explanation, produced without commentary, in terms of Model I, is (roughly) consistent with prevailing explanations. It should be noted that R. Hilsman's explanation in To Move a Nation, New York, 1967, is closer to Model III.

2. Diplomatic Pressures. Several forms were considered: an appeal to the U.N. or O.A.S. for an inspection team, a secret approach to Khrushchev, and a direct approach to Khrushchev, perhaps at a summit meeting. The United States would demand that the missiles be removed, but the final settlement might include neutralization of Cuba with U.S. withdrawal from the Guantanamo base or withdrawal of U.S. Jupiters from Turkey or Italy.

Each form of the diplomatic approach had its own drawbacks. To arraign the Soviet Union before the U.N. Security Council held little promise since the Russians could veto any proposed action, and Zorin of the Soviet Union happened to be chairman of the Council for October. While the diplomats argued, the missiles would become operational. To send a secret emissary to Khrushchev demanding that the missiles be withdrawn would be to pose untenable alternatives. On the one hand, an invitation would have been issued to Khrushchev to seize the diplomatic initiative, perhaps committing himself to strategic retaliation in response to an attack on tiny Cuba, certainly mobilizing non-aligned and left-wing opinion to press the United States towards a conference a la Munich. On the other hand, an ultimatum which no great power could accept would have been tendered, thus justifying either a pre-emptive strike against the United States or at a minimum, our indictment in the court of history. To confront Khrushchev at a summit would guarantee demands for U.S. concessions, and the analogy between U.S. missiles in Turkey and Russian missiles in Cuba could not be erased.

Buy why not trade U.S. Jupiters in Turkey and Italy, which the President had previously ordered withdrawn, for the missiles in Cuba? While withdrawals of our Jupiters in Turkey and Italy in order to replace them with superior, less vulnerable Mediterranean Polaris submarines was an action the United States had chosen, the middle of a crisis was no time for concessions. The offer of such a deal might confirm Soviet suspicions that the West would yield and thus tempt them to demand more. It would certainly confirm European suspicions that the United States would sacrifice their security in order to protect our interests in an area of no concern to them, thus widening cracks in the alliance. Other nations would observe the United States's willingness to compromise the interests of third nations when the chips were down. Finally, the basic issue should be kept clear. As the President stated in reply to Bertrand Russell, "I think your attention might well be directed to the burglars rather than to those who have caught the burglars." [26]

3. A secret approach to Castro. The crisis provided an opportunity to split Castro from the Soviets by offering him the alternatives, "split or fall." The difficulty with this proposal was that the missiles were property of the Soviet Union. Soviet troops transported, constructed, guarded, and controlled the missiles. Their removal would thus depend on a Soviet decision.

4. Invasion. The United States could take this occasion not only to remove the missiles but also to rid itself of Castro. A Navy exercise

had been long scheduled in which Marines, ferried from Florida in naval vessels, would liberate the imprisoned island of Vieques.[27] Why not simply shift the point of disembarkment? (The Pentagon's foresight in planning this operation would be an appropriate antidote to the CIA's myopia in the Bay of Pigs!)

Preparations were made for an invasion, but as the last, not the first step. An invasion in which American troops would be forced to confront 20,000 Soviet troops in the first case of direct contact between the troops of the two super powers in the postwar world posed the gravest possible risk of a world war and offered the prospect of an equivalent Soviet move against Berlin.

5. Surgical air strike. The missile sites should be removed by a clean, swift conventional attack with or without advance warning. This was the firm, effective counter-action which the Soviet attempted deception deserved. A surgical strike would effectively remove the missiles and thus eliminate both the danger that the missiles might become operational and the fear that the Soviets would discover the American discovery and act first. Preceded by Presidential announcement of the missiles' presence on Saturday and accompanied by an explanatory address, increased surveillance of the island to prevent further installations, and a call for a summit, this would settle the matter.

The initial attraction of this alternative was dulled by several difficulties. First, could the strike really be "surgical"? Even if the missile sites could have been destroyed, the Soviet MIG's and IL-28 bombers might attack Guantanamo or the Southeastern United States. Moreover, as the Air Force assured the ExCom, destruction of all the missiles could not be guaranteed.[28] Some might be fired during the attack; some might not have been identified. In order to guarantee destruction of Soviet and Cuban means of retaliating, what was required was not a surgical but rather a massive attack -- of at least 500 sorties. This might result in chaos and political collapse, eventually necessitating a U.S. invasion. Second, a surprise air attack would of course kill Russians at the missile sites -- and elsewhere, if the attack were more massive. An attack on the military troops and citizens of a super power could not be regarded lightly. Pressures on the Soviet Union to retaliate would be so strong that an attack on Berlin or Turkey was highly probable.

Third, the key problem with this program was that of advance warning. Could the President of the United States, with his memory of Pearl Harbor and his vision of future U.S. responsibility, order a "Pearl Harbor in reverse"? For 175 years, unannounced Sunday morning attacks had been an anathema to our tradition.[30]

6. Blockade. Indirect military action in the form of a blockade of one of several types became more attractive as the ExCom uncovered the ugliness of the other alternatives. An embargo on military shipments to Cuba enforced by a naval blockade was not without its own problems, however.

Even the term "blockade" presented a formidable difficulty. Could the U.S. blockade Cuba without inviting Soviet reprisal in Berlin? The likely solution to joint blockades would be the lifting of both blockades, bringing the United States back to the present point and allowing the Soviets additional time to complete the missiles. Second, there were significant similarities between the drawbacks which disqualified the air strike and the possible consequences of the blockade. If Soviet ships did not stop, the United States would be forced to fire the first shot, inviting retaliation. Moreover, Castro might attack American ships blockading his island.

Third, a blockade would deny the traditional freedom of the seas demanded by several of our close allies and might be held illegal, in violation of the U.N. Charter and international law, unless the United States could obtain a two-thirds vote in the OAS. Finally, how could a blockade be related to the problem, namely, the existence of nearly 75 missiles already present on the island of Cuba and approaching operational readiness daily? A blockade offered the Soviets a spectrum of mischievous alternatives from respecting the blockade and talking while the missile installations were completed to counter-blockade and propaganda initiatives. Was a fait accompli not required?

In spite of these enormous difficulties the blockade had comparative advantages: (1) It was a middle course between inaction and attack, aggressive enough to communicate firmness of intention, but nevertheless not so precipitous as a strike. (2) It placed on Khrushchev the burden of choice concerning the next step. He could avoid a direct military clash by keeping his ships away. His was the last clear chance. (3) No possible military confrontation could be more acceptable to the United States than a naval engagement in the Caribbean. Our world-wide naval superiority was unquestioned. At our doorstep, a naval blockade was invincible. (4) The flexibility of this first step allowed the United States by conventional buildup in Florida to exploit the threat of subsequent non-nuclear steps in each of which the United States enjoyed significant superiority.

Particular arguments about advantages and disadvantages were powerful. But the explanation of the American choice of the blockade lies in a more general principle. The blockade was the United States' only real option. For as President Kennedy stated in drawing the moral of the crisis:

Above all, while defending our own vital interests, nuclear powers must avert those confrontations which bring an adversary to a choice of either a humiliating retreat or a nuclear war. To adopt that kind of course in the nuclear age would be evidence only of the bankruptcy of our policy -- of a collective death wish for the world.[31]

III. MODEL II: ORGANIZATIONAL PROCESS

For some purposes, governmental behavior can be usefully summarized as choice of a unitary, rational decisionmaker: centrally controlled, completely informed, and value maximizing. But this abstraction must not be allowed to conceal the fact that "governments" consist of a conglomerate of semi-feudal, loosely allied organizations, each with a substantial life of its own. Government leaders do sit formally, and to some extent in fact, on top of this conglomerate. But governments perceive problems as organizations feel pinched. Governments define alternatives and estimate consequences as organizations process information. Government action consists of the acts of these organizations. What a government does that is relevant to a problem can therefore be understood according to a second conceptual model, not as deliberate choice but rather as outputs of large organizations functioning according to standard patterns of behavior.

To be responsive to a broad spectrum of problem areas, governments consist of large organizations among which primary responsibility for particular areas is divided. Each organization attends to a narrow set of problems and acts in quasi-independence concerning these problems. But few important problems fall exclusively within the domain of a single organization. Thus government behavior relevant to any important problem reflects the independent output of several organizations, sometimes partially coordinated by government leaders. Government leaders can substantially disturb, but not substantially control, the behavior of large organizations.

Each organization must attend to a set of problems, process masses of information, and perform (and be prepared to perform) a range of actions. To perform these jobs the behavior of large numbers of individuals must be coordinated. Coordination requires standard operating procedures: rules according to which things are done. Assured capability for reliable performance of action which depends upon the behavior of hundreds of persons requires established "programs." Indeed, if the eleven members of a football team are to perform adequately on any particular down, each man must not "do what he thinks needs to be done" or "do what the quarterback tells him to do." Rather, each player must perform the maneuvers specified by a previously established play, which the quarterback has simply called in this situation.

At any specified time, a government consists of existing organizations, each with a fixed set of standard operating procedures and repertoires. The behavior of these organizations -- and consequently of the government -- relevant to an issue in any particular instance, therefore, is determined primarily by routines established in these organizations prior to that instance. Explanation of a government action starts from this base line, noting incremental deviations from it.

But organizations do change. Learning occurs gradually, over time. Occasionally -- however rarely -- sharp deviations from the base line do happen. Dramatic organizational change occurs in response to major crises. Both learning and change are influenced by existing organizational capabilities.

Borrowed from studies of organizations, these loosely formulated propositions concerning governments and organizations amount simply to tendencies. Each must be modified by hedges like "other things being equal" and "under certain conditions." In particular instances, tendencies hold -- more or less. In specific situations, the relevant question is: more or less? But this is as it should be. For, on the one hand, "organizations" are no more homogenous a class than "solids". When scientists tried to generalize about "solids," they achieved similar results. Solids tend to expand when heated, but some do and some don't. More adequate categorization of the various elements now lumped under the rubric "organizations" is thus required. On the other hand, the behavior of particular organizations seems considerably more complex than the behavior of solids. Additional information about each specific case is required for further specification of the tendency statements. In spite of these two caveats, the characterization of government action as organizational output differs distinctly from Model I. Attempts to understand problems of foreign affairs in terms of this frame of reference should produce quite different explanations.

The influence of studies of organizations upon the present literature of international affairs is difficult to discern.[32] This lacuna stems from two failures. First, specialists in international politics are not students of organization theory. Second, organization theory has only recently come to study organizations as decision-makers and has not yet produced behavioral studies of foreign policy organizations from the decisionmaking perspective. It would be unreasonable to expect that these gaps will remain unfilled much longer. Considerable progress has been made in the study of the business firm as a decisionmaking organization. Scholars have begun translating these insights into contexts in which the decisionmaker is a government organization rather than a firm. Interest in government organizations is spreading rapidly among institutions and individuals concerned with actual government operations.

As an expression more of the prospects than of the payoffs in this area of inquiry, an organizational process paradigm is articulated. While not employed in the present literature, it should be suggestive of paradigms which will soon be important. Without the necessary but missing behavioral studies of the organizations which constitute governments, this formulation must remain somewhat abstract. In order for the paradigm to get a grip in a specific case, the bare bones of its generalized statement must be fleshed out by detailed study of the characteristics of each organization involved. Nevertheless, the present state of knowledge in this area does suggest a number of interesting implications relevant to the limits of explanations and predictions according to the rational policy model.

This paradigm's debt both to the orientation and insights of Herbert A. Simon and to the behavioral model of the firm stated by Richard Cyert and James March is considerable. [33] Here, however, one is forced to grapple with the less routine, less quantified, less categorized functions of the less differentiated elements termed government organizations.

ORGANIZATIONAL PROCESS PARADIGM

I. Basic Unit of Analysis: Policy as Organizational Output

The decisions and actions which constitute the happenings of international politics are outputs of organizational processes in three critical senses. First, the actual happenings, for example, Chinese entry into the Korean War, i.e., the fact that Chinese soldiers were firing rifles at American soldiers south of the Yalu in 1950, are organizational actions: the actions of men who are soldiers in platoons which are in companies and so on within armies, responding as privates to lieutenants who are responsible to captains and so on to the commander, moving into Korea, advancing against enemy troops, and firing according to fixed routines of the Chinese army. Though government leaders can trim the edges of this output and exercise some choice in combining outputs, the mass of behavior is determined by previously established repertoires. Second, existing organizational processes, that is, administrative routines for employing present physical capabilities, constitute the range of effective choice open to government leaders confronted with any problem. Only the existence of men, equipped and trained as armies and capable of being transported to North Korea, made entry into the Korean War a live option for the Chinese leaders. The fact that the fixed programs (equipment, men, and routines) existing at the particular time exhaust the range of buttons which leaders can push is not always perceived by these leaders. But in every case it is critical for an understanding of what is actually done. Third, organizational outputs structure the situation within the narrow constraints of which leaders must contribute their "decision" concerning an issue. Outputs raise the problem, provide the information, and make the initial moves which color the fact of the issue which is turned to the leaders. As Theodore Sorensen has written about Presidential decisionmaking: "Presidents rarely, if ever, make decisions -- particularly in foreign affairs -- in the sense of writing their conclusions on a clean slate....The basic decisions, which confine their choices, have all too often been previously made." [34] If one understands the structure of the situation and the face of the issue -- which are determined by organizational outputs -- the formal choice by the leaders is almost always anti-climactic.

Analysis of formal governmental choice centers on the information provided and options defined by organizations, the existing organizational capabilities which exhaust the effective choices open to the leaders, and the outputs of relevant organizations which fix the location of

pieces on the chess board and shade the appearance of the issue. Analysis of the aggregation of actual occurrences which comprise government behavior relevant to an issue focuses on executive outputs of individual organizations as well as organizational capabilities and organizational positioning of the pieces on the chess board.

II. Focal Concepts

1. Organizational Actors. The actor is not a monolithic "nation" or "government" but rather a constellation of loosely allied organizations which acts only as relevant organizations act. The agent for specific elements in the action which is being analyzed is normally one of the departments or agencies, for example, in the U.S. Government, the Navy, the Department of State, or the CIA.

2. Factored Problems and Fractionated Power. Cognizance of the multiple facets of foreign affairs requires that problems be factored and parcelled out as broad areas of responsibility to various organizations which constitute the government. Within the U.S. Government, the Department of State has primary responsibility for diplomacy, the Department of Defense for military defense and security, the Treasury for economic affairs, and the CIA for intelligence.

In order to avoid paralysis, primary power accompanies primary responsibility. If organizations are permitted to do anything, a large part of what they do will be determined within the organization. Thus each organization perceives problems, processes information, and performs some actions in quasi-independence (within broad guidelines of national policy).

Factored problems and fractionated power are two edges of the same sword. Factoring permits more detailed, specialized attention to particular facets of problems than would be possible if government leaders tried to cope by themselves. But this additional attention is bought at a price. The creation of what Richard Neustadt has called "separated institutions sharing power" must be paid for in the coin of discretion for considerable choice concerning what shall be attended to and how organizational responses are programmed.

3. Parochial Priorities, Perceptions, and Issues. Primary responsibility for a narrow set of problems encourages organizational parochialism. Selective information available to the organization, recruitment of personnel into the organization, tenure of individuals in the organization, small group pressures within the organization, and distribution of rewards by the organization enhances these pressures. Clients (e.g., interest groups), government allies (e.g., Congressional committees), and extra-national counterparts (e.g., the British Ministry of Defense for the Office of the Secretary of Defense [ISA] or the British Foreign Office for the Department of State [EUR]), galvanize this parochialism. Thus organizations develop relatively stable propensities concerning operational priorities, perceptions, and issues. For example, the U. S. Air Force is manned by careerists

on a highly structured ladder, promotion on which is critically dependent on years of demonstrated, distinguished service to the Air Force mission. Work routines (flight training), patterns of association (Air Force colleagues) and information channels (accents on enemy aircraft and US aircraft design) combine with external pressures from Air Force organizations and friends in Congress to make the Air Force's continual search for new manned bombers predictable.

4. Central Coordination and Control. Action requires decentralization of responsibility and power. But problems do not fit neatly into independent, separable domains. Each organization's performance of its "job" has major consequences for other departments. Important problems lap over the jurisdictions of several organizations. Thus the necessity for decentralization runs headlong into the requirement for coordination. Advocates of one horn or the other of this dilemma: responsive action entails decentralized power vs. coordinated action requires central control -- account for a considerable part of the persistent demand for government reorganization.

Both the necessity for coordination and the centrality of problems of foreign policy to national welfare guarantee the interest of government leaders in the activities of the organizations among which problems are factored and power divided. Government leaders can intervene and disturb organizational propensities and routines. Central direction and persistent control of organizational activity, however, is not possible. To the extent that rewards and punishments for the members of an organization are distributed by higher authorities, these authorities can exercise some control by specifying criteria in terms of which organizational output is to be judged. These criteria become constraints within which organizational activity proceeds. But constraint is a crude instrument of control. Specification of relevant operational criteria for the activities of most government organizations is incredibly difficult. Moreover, in the U.S. government, the leader's control over critical rewards and punishments is severely limited.

Intervention by government leaders does sometimes change the activity of an organization in an intended direction. But instances are fewer than might be expected. As Franklin Roosevelt, the master manipulator of government organizations, remarked:

The Treasury is so large and far-flung and ingrained in its practices that I find it is almost impossible to get the action and results I want....But the Treasury is not to be compared with the State Department. You should go through the experience of trying to get any changes in the thinking, policy, and action of the career diplomats and then you'd know what a real problem was. But the Treasury and the State Department put together are nothing compared with the Na-a-vy ...To change anything in the Na-a-vy is like punching a feather bed. You punch it with your right and you punch it with your left until you are finally exhausted, and then you find the damn bed just as it was before you started punching.¹³⁵

John F. Kennedy seems to have agreed: "The State Department", he once asserted, "is a bowl full of jelly."^[36] And lest the McNamara revolution in the Defense Department seem too striking a counter-example, the Navy's recent rejection of McNamara's major intervention in Naval weapon procurement (the F-111B) should be studied as an antidote.

5. Action as Organizational Output. The activity of each organization produces outputs. This activity is characterized by:

(A) Goals; Acceptable Level Constraints. Although seldom revealed by formal mandates, an operational set of constraints defines acceptable level performance for each organization. These constraints are typically embedded in rules for promotion and reward, budgeting procedures, and mundane operating practices. Central among these constraints is organizational health, defined usually in terms of bodies assigned and dollars appropriated. The set of constraints emerges from a mix of expectations and demands of other organizations in the government, statutory authority, demands from citizens and special interests groups, and bargaining within the organization. The constraints represent a quasi-resolution of conflict -- the constraints are relatively stable, so there is some resolution, but conflict among alternative goals is always latent, hence it is a quasi-resolution. Typically, the constraints are formulated as imperatives to avoid roughly specified discomforts and disasters.

For example, U.S. Air Force behavior is characterized by effective imperatives to avoid:

- (1) Less than an incremental increase in dollars budgeted;
- (2) Less than an incremental increase in bodies;
- (3) Less than an incremental increase in the number of Air Force pilots;
- (4) Reduction in the percentage of the military budget allocated to the Air Force;
- (5) Encroachment of other services on Air Force roles and missions;
- (6) Less than superiority in the strategic balance;
- (7) Less than equality or superiority against every class of enemy aircraft;
- (8) Obsolescence of Air Force equipment.

The fourth constraint is at the heart of what many civilians in the office of the Secretary of Defense found puzzling in the Air Force's

outburst at the first Kennedy budget -- which increased total Air Force dollars by approximately 4 percent. That budget also reduced the Air Force's percentage of the defense pie.

(B) Sequential Attention to Goals. The existence of conflict among operational constraints is resolved by the device of sequential attention. As problems arise, the subunits of the organization most concerned with that problem deal with it in terms of the constraints they take to be most important. When the next problem arises, another cluster of subunits deal with it, focusing on a different set of constraints.

(C) Standard Operating Procedures. Organizations perform their "higher" functions, e.g., attending to problem areas, monitoring information, and preparing relevant responses for likely contingencies, by doing "lower" tasks, e.g., preparing budgets, producing reports, and developing hardware. Reliable performance of these tasks requires regularized behavior patterns characterized by simple standard operating procedures. Rules of thumb permit concerted action by large numbers of individuals as responses to basic stimuli. The rules are usually quite simple in order to facilitate easy learning and unambiguous application. Since procedures are "standard" they do not change quickly or easily. Without these standard procedures, it would not be possible to perform certain concerted tasks. But because of standard procedures, organizational behavior in particular instances appears unduly formalized, sluggish, and often inappropriate.

(D) Programs and Repertoires. Many organizations must be capable of performing actions in which the behavior of hundreds of individuals is carefully coordinated. Assured performance requires clusters of established, rehearsed standard operating procedures for producing specific actions, e.g., fighting enemy units or constructing military installations. Each cluster comprises a "program" (in the terms both of drama and of computers) which the organization has available for dealing with a situation. The list of programs relevant to a type of activity, e.g., fighting, constitutes an organizational repertoire. The numbers of programs in a repertoire is always quite limited. When properly triggered, organizations execute programs; programs cannot be substantially changed in a particular situation. The more complex the action and the greater the number of individuals involved, the more important are programs and repertoires as determinants of organizational behavior.

(E) Problem-directed Search. Where situations cannot be construed as standard, organizations engage in search. The style of search, and the solution in any particular case are largely determined by existing routines. Organizational search for alternative courses of action is problem-oriented: it focuses on the atypical discomfort which must be avoided. It is simple-minded: the neighborhood of the symptom is searched first; then, the neighborhood of the current alternative. Patterns of search reveal biases which reflect special

training or experience of various parts of the organization, expectations, and communication distortions.

(F) Uncertainty Avoidance. Organizations do not attempt to estimate the probability distribution of future occurrences. Rather, organizations avoid uncertainty. By arranging a negotiated environment, organizations avoid the requirements that future reactions of other parts of their environment be anticipated. The primary environment: relations with other organizations which comprise the government, is stabilized by agreed budgetary splits, accepted areas of responsibility, and established conventional practices. The secondary environment: relations with the international world, is stabilized between allies by the establishment of contracts, e.g. alliances, and club relations, e.g. State and Foreign Office or Treasury and Treasury. Between enemies, contracts and accepted conventional practices, for example, what Kennedy referred to in the Cuban missile crisis as the rules governing "the precarious status quo", perform this function. Where the international environment cannot be negotiated, organizations deal with remaining uncertainties by establishing a set of standard scenarios that constitute the contingencies for which they prepare. For example, the standard scenario for the Tactical Air Command of the U.S. Air Force involves combat with enemy aircraft. Planes are designed and pilots trained for this contingency. That these preparations are not relevant to more probable contingencies, e.g., provision of close-in ground support in Viet Nam, has had little impact on the scenario. Internal scoring systems are devised for measuring success in preparation for these scenarios.

(G) Organizational Learning and Change. The parameters of organizational decisionmaking change slowly over time as search in response to non-standard problems changes existing routines and allows the treatment of what were new situations as standard problems. Dramatic change occurs only in response to major crises. Confronted with undeniable failure of procedures and repertoires, authorities outside the organization demand change, existing personnel are less resistant to change, and critical members of the organization are replaced by individuals committed to change.

III. Dominant Inference Pattern

If a nation performs an action of this type today, its organizational components must yesterday have been performing (or have had established routines for performing) an action only marginally different from that action. The most adequate explanation of why a nation is doing such and such today is that its organizations were doing such and such yesterday. Conversely, the most reliable prediction of what a nation will do tomorrow is what its organizations are doing today. The best explanation of t is $t-1$; the best prediction of $t+1$ is t . Model II's explanatory power is achieved by uncovering the organizational routines and repertoires which produced the outputs that comprise the puzzling occurrence.

This inference pattern and the range of propositions which this paradigm yields are illustrated clearly (though in terms of a quite different conceptual orientation) by Roberta Wohlstetter's excellent study, Pearl Harbor.^[37] The question which the book addresses is: "Why Pearl Harbor?" That is, how could the U.S. have failed to anticipate the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor given the extraordinary intelligence resources available? The puzzle: why America slept? The rational policy model demands confusion or conspiracy -- mass incompetence or diabolic design. By December 7, Admiral Kimmel, the Pacific Fleet Commander, had received the following information: A Naval War warning on November 28, report of a change in Japanese codes (evaluated as very unusual), reports of Japanese ships in Camranh Bay, orders to be alert for Japanese action in the Pacific, messages deciphered from Japan's most secure code ordering code-machine and secret paper destruction by Japanese embassies, U.S. authorization to destroy codes and secret papers in outlying islands, FBI notice that the local Japanese consul was burning papers, and personal warnings from Admiral Stark in Washington. Assuming honesty and competence, a Model I analyst would be led to predict: (1) the fleet would be out of the harbor, (2) the island would be air patrolled, (3) the emergency warning center would be staffed and (4) the Army would have been notified under the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan. Each of these predictions fails. Instead the Navy's activity on December 7 was identical with its behavior on December 6 which differed imperceptibly from its behavior on December 5 and so on. Each of these details represents standard outputs of an organization functioning according to established routines.

IV. General Propositions

1. Organizational Action. Activity according to standard operating procedures and programs, does not constitute far-sighted, flexible adaptation to "the issue" (as it is conceived by the analyst). Detail and nuance of actions by organizations are determined predominantly by organizational routines, not government leaders' direction. Thus the rational policy model's attempt to read out of these details, hints concerning subtle plans, each of the moves falling on a smooth trend-line of government policy is misguided.

(A) Standard operating procedures amount to routines for dealing with standard situations. While routines allow large numbers of ordinary individuals to deal with numerous instances, day after day, without considerable thought, by responding to basic stimuli, this regularized capability for adequate performance is purchased at the price of standardization. If the standard operating procedures are appropriate, average performance, i.e., performance averaged over the range of cases, is better than it would be if each instance were approached individually (given fixed talent, timing, and resource constraints). But specific instances, particularly interesting instances which may not have "standard" characteristics, are often handled sluggishly or inappropriately.

(B) A program, i.e., a complex action chosen from a narrow repertoire, is not designed for the specific situation in which it is executed. Rather, the program is, at best, the most appropriate of the programs in a previously developed repertoire.

(C) Since repertoires are developed by parochial organizations for standard scenarios defined by that organization, programs available for dealing with a particular situation are often ill-suited.

2. Limited Flexibility and Incremental Change. Major lines of organizational action are straight, i.e., behavior at one time is marginally different from that behavior at t-1. Simple-minded predictions work best: behavior at t+1 will be marginally different from behavior at the present time.

(A) Organizational budgets change incrementally -- both with respect to totals and with respect to intra-organizational splits. Though organizations could divide the money available each year by carving up the pie anew (in the light of objectives or changes in the environment), in practice, organizations take last year's budget as a base and adjust incrementally. Predictions which require large budgetary shifts in a single year between organizations or between units within an organization should be hedged.

(B) Organizational priorities, perceptions, and issues are relatively stable.

(C) Organizational procedures and repertoires change incrementally.

(D) New programs and activities typically consist of marginal adaptations of existing programs and activities.

(E) A program once undertaken is not dropped at the point where objective costs outweigh benefits. Organizational stakes in adopted programs carry them quite beyond the loss point.

As early as March, 1940, Marshall had requested that an evaluative branch be established within G-2. Yet at the end of 1941 "military intelligence was specifically concerned, particularly concerned, and practically solely concerned ... with anti-subversive precautions and operations." [38] According to Marshall's request, G-2's staff had been expanded, but the additions were concentrated in the ongoing espionage program.

3. Administrative Feasibility. In explanation, analysis, and prediction, administrative feasibility must be a major dimension. A considerable gap separates what leaders choose (or might rationally have chosen) and what organizations implement.

(A) Organizations are blunt instruments. Projects which require that several organizations act with high degrees of precision and coordination as surgical scalpels are not likely to succeed.

(B) Projects which demand that existing organizational units deal with problems quite different from their accustomed duties and perform functions for which the organizational routines do not constitute "programs" are rarely accomplished in their designed form.

(C) Government leaders can expect that each organization will do its "part" in terms of what the organization knows how to do.

(D) Government leaders can expect incomplete and distorted information from each organization concerning its part of the problem.

(E) Where an assigned piece of a problem is contrary to the existing goals of an organization, resistance to implementation of that piece will be encountered.

These propositions illuminate Wohlstetter's explanation of the success of the Japanese attack on the Philippines -- given nine hours warning.[39] It succeeded, "not because of inadequate intelligence. Rather, our defense was simply not prepared for sudden air attack and had no capacity for responding to warning." After the war warning of November 27, MacArthur had ordered the heavy bombers transferred to a safer field. The job had not been done. Rather, the Army had been doing what it knew how to do: re-enforcing the island.

V. Specific Propositions

1. Deterrence. The probability of nuclear attack is more sensitive to a number of organizational factors than it is to the relevant range of balance and imbalance, stability and instability. First, if a nuclear attack occurs, it will result from organizational activity: the firing of rockets by members of a missile group. The enemy's control system, i.e., physical mechanisms and standard procedures which determine who can launch rockets when, is critical. Second, the enemy's programs for bringing his strategic forces to alert status determine probabilities of accidental firing and momentum. At the outbreak of World War I, if the Russian tsar had understood the organizational processes which his order of full mobilization triggered, he would have known that he had chosen war. Third, organizational repertoires fix the range of effective choice open to enemy leaders. The menu available to Tsar Nicholas in 1914 had two entrees: full mobilization and no mobilization. Partial mobilization was not an organizational option. Fourth, since organizational routines set the chessboard, the training and deployment of troops and nuclear weapons is crucial. Given that the outbreak of hostilities in Berlin is more probable than most scenarios for nuclear war, facts about deployment, training, and tactical nuclear equipment of Soviet troops stationed in East Germany -- which will influence the face of the issue seen by Soviet leaders at the outbreak of hostilities and the manner in which choice is implemented -- are as critical as the question of "balance".

2. Sovietology. Particular Soviet actions are outputs of organizations functioning according to standard patterns, within broad constraints.

(A) Force Posture. Soviet force posture is determined by a number of organizational factors, within certain constraints set by government leaders. Processes and procedures of the organizations which comprise the Soviet military and the research and development community are major determinants of this posture. Thus, the "bomber gap" which was predicted by many Model I Sovietologists for the 1950's never materialized. The fact that the Soviet military establishment included no Air Force, whose business it would have been to expand this system, does not seem irrelevant. Soviet development and deployment of an Anti-Ballistic Missile system seems to be the result of activity of a Soviet organization, the PVO, whose perceptions, priorities and budget have permitted development and deployment by continuation. (For U.S.-S.U. negotiations to succeed in limiting deployment of ABM's, Soviet leaders will be forced to interfere with this organization's processes and constrain its activity).

VI. Evidence

The bones of this paradigm allow an analyst to modify expectations generated by the rational policy model. The general propositions do yield some explanatory and predictive power. But satisfactory explanation according to this paradigm requires information about the behavior of specific organizations. Few behavioral studies of government organizations have been produced. Until more studies become available, categorization of organizations and specification of propositions will be severely limited.

THE IMPOSITION OF A U.S. BLOCKADE OF CUBA

Organizational Intelligence. At 7:00 P.M. on October 22, 1962, President Kennedy delivered the major foreign policy address of his career. Disclosing American discovery of the presence of Soviet strategic missiles in Cuba, the President declared a "strict quarantine on all offensive military equipment under shipment to Cuba," and demanded that "Chairman Khrushchev halt and eliminate this clandestine, reckless, and provocative threat to world peace." [40] This decision was reached at the pinnacle of the U.S. Government after a critical week of deliberation. What initiated that precious week were photographs of Soviet missile sites in Cuba taken on October 14 by Air Force Major Rudolph Anderson. But these pictures might not have become available until a week later. In that case, the President speculated, "I don't think probably we would have chosen as prudently as we finally did." [41] U.S. leaders might have received this information two weeks earlier -- if a U-2 had flown over this area on the first day of October. Thus what determined the context in which American leaders came to choose the blockade was the discovery of missiles on October 14.

There has been considerable debate over alleged American "intelligence failures" in the Cuban missile crisis. Critics have faulted the intelligence community for "philosophical preconceptions" which led it to downgrade evidence,[42] for "concentrating on intentions rather than capabilities,"[43] and for explaining away evidence in an attempt to "save a theory." [44] But what both critics and defenders have neglected is the fact that information about Soviet missiles in Cuba came to the attention of the President on October 14 rather than two weeks earlier or a week later as a consequence of the routines and procedures of the organizations which constitute the U.S. intelligence community. These "eyes and ears" of the U.S. Government function less as integral parts of a unitary head with entertains preconceptions and theories, than as organs which perform their tasks in a fashion. The job of intelligence requires an incredibly complex organization, coordinating large numbers of actors, processing endless piles of information. That this organization must function according to established routines and standard procedures is a simple fact. The organizational routines and standard operating procedures by which the U.S. intelligence community discovered Soviet missiles in Cuba were neither more nor less successful than they had been the previous month or were to be in the months to follow.[45]

The available record permits a fairly reliable reconstruction of the major features of the patterns of behavior by which the Soviet missiles were discovered. Intelligence on activities within Cuba came from four primary sources: shipping intelligence, refugees, intelligence agents within Cuba, and U-2 over-flights.[46] Intelligence on all ships going to Cuba provided a catalogue of information on the number of Soviet shipments to Cuba (85 by October 3), the character of these ships (size, registry, and the fact that several of the large-hatch lumber ships were used), and the character of their cargoes (transport, electronic and construction equipment, SAM's, MIG's, patrol boats and Soviet technicians).[47] Refugees from Cuba brought innumerable reports of Soviet missiles, Chinese soldiers and a variety of other atrocities. For 1959 -- before the Soviet Union had begun sending any arms whatever to Cuba -- the CIA file of reports devoted solely to missiles in Cuba was five inches thick.[48] The low reliability of these reports made their collection and processing of only marginal value. Nevertheless the CIA staff at Opa Locka, Florida collected, collated, and compared the results of interrogations of refugees -- though often with a lag since refugees numbered in the thousands. Reports from agents in Cuba produced information concerning the evacuation of Cubans from the port of Mariel and the secrecy which surrounded unloading and transport of equipment (trucks were lowered into the holes, loaded, and hoisted out covered with tarpulin), a sighting and sketch of the rear profile of a missile on a Cuban highway heading West, and a report of missile activity in the Pinar del Rio province.[49] But this information had to be transferred from sub-agent to master-agent and then to the United States, a procedure which usually meant a lag of ten days between sighting and arrival in Washington. The U-2 camera acquired the highest quality U.S. intelligence. Photographs taken from a height of fourteen miles allowed

analysts to distinguish painted lines on a parking lot or recognize a new kind of cannon on the wing of an airplane.[50] U-2's flew over Cuba on August 29, September 5, 17, 26, 29, and October 5 and 7 before the October 14 flight which discovered the missiles.[51] These earlier flights produced information on SAM sites (15 under construction according to intelligence available on October 3 and 25 predicted), coastal defense missile sites, MIG's, missile patrol boats, and IL-28 light bombers.[52]

Intelligence experts in Washington processed information received from these four sources and produced estimates on certain contingencies. Hindsight clarifies the fact that a number of clear indicators of a high probability of the presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba were "in the system." Yet the notorious "September estimate" concluded that the Soviet Union would not introduce offensive missiles into Cuba.[53] No U-2 flight was directed over the western end of Cuba (after September 5) before October 4.[54] No U-2 flew over the western end of Cuba until the flight which discovered the Soviet missiles on October 14.[55] Can these "failures" be accounted for in organizational terms?

On September 19 when the United States Intelligence Board (USIB), the highest assembly of the American intelligence community, met to consider the question of Cuba, the "system" contained the following information: (1) shipping intelligence had noted the arrival in Cuba of two large-hatch Soviet lumber ships, the Omsk and Poltava, which the intelligence report also noted were riding high in the water; (2) refugee reports of countless sightings of missiles, but also a report that Castro's private pilot, after a night of drinking in Havana, had boasted: "We will fight to the death and perhaps we can win because we have everything, including atomic weapons"; (3) a sighting by a CIA agent of the rear profile of a strategic missile; (4) U-2 photos produced by flights of August 29, September 5 and 17 showing the construction of a number of SAM sites and other defenseie missiles.[56]

Not all of this information was on the desk of the estimators, however. Information does not pass from the tentacle to the top of the organization timeless. Transmission time means that facts can be "in the system" without being available to the head of the organization. Information must be winnowed at every step up the organizational hierarchy, since the number of minutes in each day limits the number of bits of information each individual can absorb. Men at the top must examine intelligence distilled from reports from sources in 100 nations, occurrences, in at least 25 of which were of equal priority with Cuba. But those who select which information their boss shall see rarely see their bosses' problem. Finally, facts which with hindsight are clear signals of an occurrence are frequently indistinguishable from surrounding "noise" before the occurrence.

Intelligence concerning large-hatch ships riding high in the water was not lost in the "noise". Shipping intelligence experts noted both the facts that the ships had large hatches and the fact that the ships

were riding high in the water. Moreover, they spelled out the inference: the ships must be carrying "space consuming" cargo.^[57] These facts were carefully included in the catalogue of intelligence concerning shipping. For experts sensitive to the Soviet's pressing requirement for ships, however, neither the facts nor the inference carried a special signal. The refugee report of Castro's private pilot's remark had been received at Opa Locka along with vast reams of inaccurate and even deliberately false reports generated by the refugee community. This report and a thousand others had to be checked and compared before being sent to Washington. The two weeks required for initial processing could have been shortened by a large increase in resources devoted to this source of information.^[58] But the yield of this source was already quite marginal. There was little reason to expect that a change in procedures which might have reduced transmission time to one week would be worth the cost. The CIA agent's sighting of the rear profile of a strategic missile had occurred on September 12; transmission time from agent sighting to arrival in Washington typically took nine to twelve days. That report arrived at CIA headquarters on September 21, two days after the USIB meeting. Shortening this transmission time would impose severe cost in terms of danger to sub-agents, agents, and communication networks. U-2 flights had produced no hard indication of the presence of offensive missiles. The flight over Western Cuba on September 5, revealed SAM installations which were approaching completion. Then on September 9 a U-2 on "loan" to the Chinese Nationalists was shot down over mainland China.^[59] Recalling the outcry and debacle which accompanied the Soviet downing of Francis Gary Powers' U-2 on May 1, 1960, over the Soviet Union, the Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance (COMOR), whose responsibility it was to approve each U-2 flight, was quickly convened.^[60] The intelligence community feared that a fresh outcry raised round the world would force the abandonment of U-2 flights and thus mean the loss of its most reliable source of information. The State Department pressed arguments concerning the political consequences of the loss of another U-2, for example, over Cuba. As a result, it was decided that rather than flying up one side of the island and down the other, future flights should "dip into" Cuban airspace and peer as much as possible from the periphery. This meeting also decided that U-2's should concentrate on the eastern half of Cuba rather than the western tip, where SAM's were known to be approaching operational readiness.^[61]

On the information available, the chiefs of intelligence who produced the estimate that the Soviet would not introduce offensive missiles into Cuba made a reasonable and defensible judgment.^[62] Moreover, in the light of the fact that the organizations which provided that information were processing information not only concerning that estimate but for many other estimates, and not for Cuba alone but for potential occurrences in all parts of the world, the informational base available to the estimators involved nothing out of the ordinary.

The fourteen days between the September 19 estimate and the decision in COMOR on October 4 to direct special flight over Western Cuba added a number of additional pieces to the picture. First camera

report "having to do with an area in Pinar del Rio Province...associated in generic terms with the possibility of missile activity." [63] Then on September 21 the agents' sighting of the rear profile of a missile (which had occurred on September 12) reached the desk of the heads of the CIA. [64] Shortly afterwards, the refugee report of Castro's pilot's claim also arrived. On September 27 a "hard copy" report of the agent's sighting, which had been circulated as an "advance report" on September 21, arrived. [65] This presumably included a sketch of the missile. Moreover, Colonel Wright of the CIA had been studying the pattern of SAM installations photographed by the U-2 flight over Western Cuba on September 5. [66] He noted that this trapezoidal pattern resembled photographs of SAM installations in the Soviet Union designed to protect strategic missiles. These pieces of information led some DIA analysts between September 27 and October 2 to the hypothesis that the Soviets were placing strategic missiles in the San Cristobal area. [67] Reports were also received concerning action in the Pinar del Rio area. The CIA marked the central and western end of Cuba "suspicious" on September 29 and certified highest priority for aerial reconnaissance on October 3. Thus when McCone assembled COMOR on October 4, in spite of the State Department's qualms concerning possible consequences of a loss of a U-2 over Cuba, a decision was made for an overflight of Western Cuba. [68] The gradual accumulation of pieces of evidence leading to the hypothesis that the Soviet Union was installing missiles and a decision to dispatch a U-2 over the western tip of Cuba is again routine and non-starting from an organizational perspective.

The ten day delay between decision and flight is another organizational story. [69] At the October 4 meeting, when the decision concerning the flight over Western Cuba was made, the State Department put the case concerning consequences of the loss of a U-2 over Cuba in the strongest terms. Moreover, the Defense Department took this opportunity to raise an issue important to its concerns. Given the increased danger that a U-2 would be downed, it would be better if the pilot were an officer in uniform rather than a CIA agent. Thus the Air Force should assume responsibility for U-2 flights over Cuba. To the contrary, the CIA argued that this was an intelligence operation and thus within the CIA's jurisdiction. Moreover, CIA U-2's had been modified in certain ways which gave them advantages over Air Force U-2's in averting Soviet SAM's. Five days passed while the State Department pressed for less risky alternatives such as drones and the Air Force (in Department of Defense guise) and CIA engaged in territorial disputes. On October 9 a flight plan over San Cristobal was approved by COMOR, but the CIA's dummy, Air Force pilots rather than CIA agents would take charge of the mission. At this point details become sketchy, but several members of the intelligence community have speculated that an Air Force pilot in an Air Force U-2 attempted a high altitude overflight on October 9 that "flamed out", i.e., lost power and thus had to descend in order to restart its engine. A second round between Air Force and CIA followed, as a result of which Air Force pilots were trained to fly CIA U-2's. A successful overflight took place on October 14.

This "ten day delay" constitutes some form of "failure." In the face of well-founded suspicions concerning offensive Soviet missiles in Cuba which posed a critical threat to the United States' most vital interest, squabbling between organizations whose job it is to produce this information seems entirely inappropriate. But for each of these organizations, the question involved the issue: "Whose job was it to be?" Moreover, the issue was not simply which organization was to have jurisdiction concerning U-2 flights over Cuba, but rather the broader issue of control of U-2 intelligence activities -- a very long standing territorial dispute. Thus though this delay was in one sense a "failure," it was also a nearly inevitable consequence of two facts: many jobs do not fall neatly into precisely defined organizational jurisdictions; and vigorous organizations are imperialistic.

Organizational Options. Deliberations of leaders in ExCom meetings produced broad outlines of alternatives. Details of these alternatives and blueprints for their implementation had to be specified by the organization which would be responsible for performing these tasks. These organizational outputs effectively answered the question: What, in particular, could be done?

Discussion in the ExCom quickly narrowed the live options to two: an air strike and a blockade. The choice of the blockade instead of the air strike turned on two points: (1) the argument from morality and tradition that the United States could not perpetrate a "Pearl Harbor in reverse"; (2) the belief that a "surgical" air strike was impossible.[70] Whether the United States might strike first was a question not of capability but of morality. Whether the United States could perform the surgical strike was a factual question concerning capabilities. The majority of the members of the ExCom, including the President, initially liked the air strike.[71] What effectively foreclosed this option, however, was the fact that the air strike which they wanted could not be chosen with high confidence of success. [72] After having tentatively chosen the course of prudence -- given that the surgical air strike was not an option -- Kennedy reconsidered. On Sunday morning, October 21, he called the Air Force experts to a special meeting in his living quarters where he probed once more for the option of a "surgical" air strike.[73] General Walter C. Sweeny, Commander of Tactical Air Forces, asserted again that the Air Force could guarantee no higher than ninety percent effectiveness in a surgical air strike.[74] That fact was false.

Organizations defined what the President believed U.S. military equipment and personnel were capable of performing in the Cuba missile crisis. Specification of the air strike alternative provides a classic case of military estimates. One of the alternatives outlined by the ExCom was named "air strike." Specification of the details of this alternative was delegated to the Air Force. The Air Force prepared one plan for an air strike which clearly reflected the goals and procedures of the Air Force. From that perspective the problem was simple: elimination of the Communist Cuban thorn. The Air Force was unhappy that it had been restrained from this task in 1961. Contingency plans

for dealing with Castro were already available.^[75] Thus according to the standard estimating procedures the Air Force prepared a plan to guarantee success: destruction of all missiles would be assured. As the plan was prepared, discussion among the Joint Chiefs emphasized U.S. security requirements which might be affected by the strike. The detail of that plan thus called for extensive bombardment of all missile sites, storage depots, airports, and, in deference to the Navy, the artillery batteries opposite the naval base at Guantanamo.^[76] Political leaders do not normally examine detailed war plans; this was a normal case. But the members of the ExCom repeatedly expressed bewilderment concerning Air Force assertions that the air strike would call for as many as five hundred sorties involving collateral damage, etc. The "surgical" air strike in which the political leaders were interested and which many thought the Air Force was talking about was never examined in detail by the Air Force estimators during the first week of the crisis. The grounds for Sweeny's assurance to the President that a surgical air strike would not guarantee destruction of the missiles was no careful study. Rather Air Force estimators had simply excluded the alternative with the assertion that since the MRBM's were "mobile," extensive bombing was required.

During the second week of the crisis, civilian experts examined the surgical air strike. Careful study revealed that the missiles designated "mobile" could be moved and reassembled -- in six days. These missiles were mobile in the sense that small houses are mobile. After the missiles were reclassified "movable" and detailed plans for surgical air strikes specified, this action was added to the list of live options for the end of the second week.

Organizational Implementation. The task of specifying the details of the option named "blockade" belonged to the Navy. ExCom members separated several gradients of blockade: offensive weapons only, all armaments, and all strategic goods including POL -- petroleum, oil, and lubricants. But the "details" of the operation were left to the Navy. Before the President announced the blockade on Monday evening, the first stage of the Navy's blueprint was in motion, and a problem loomed on the horizon.^[77] The Navy had a detailed plan for the blockade. The President had several less precise but equally determined notions concerning what should be done, when, and how. For the Navy the issue was one of effective implementation of the Navy's blockade -- without the meddling and interference of political leaders. For the President, the problem was to pace and manage events in such a way that the Soviet leaders would have time to see, think, and blink.

A surface chronology establishes a context within which questions arise. The President heard a discussion about operation of the blockade for the first time at the meeting of the formal National Security Council on Sunday, October 21, which ratified the ExCom's blockade decision.^[78] Admiral George Anderson, Chief of Naval Operations, described the plans and procedures.^[79] First, each approaching ship would be signaled to stop for boarding and inspection. If no response were forthcoming, a shot would be fired across her bow. Finally, if there were still no

satisfactory response, a shot would be fired into her rudder to cripple but not to sink. "You are certain that can be done?" the President inquired. "Yes, Sir!" responded the Admiral.[80] In the Monday speech, the President announced American intention to impose a quarantine. The quarantine was proclaimed Tuesday evening, after the Organization of American States approval had been obtained. The proclamation allowed a further pause, making the quarantine effective on Wednesday, October 24, at 10:00 A.M.[81] According to the public record, the first contact with a Soviet ship came on Thursday morning when an oil tanker, the Bucharest, deliberately chosen because it carried no arms, was hailed but not boarded.[82] The first boarding occurred on Friday morning when the Marcula, a Lebanese freighter under charter to the Soviets, was stopped, boarded, and inspected before being allowed to pass.[83]

Little sensitivity to organizational perspectives is required to suggest that this schedule must have caused serious friction between the Navy and the political leaders. A careful reading of available sources uncovers an instructive incident. On Tuesday the British Ambassador, Ormsby Gore, who had attended a briefing on the details of the blockade, suggested to the President that the plan for intercepting Soviet ships far out of reach of jets in Cuba did not facilitate Khruschev's hard decision.[84] Why not make the interception much closer to Cuba and thus give the Russian leader more time? According to the public account and the recollection of a number of individuals involved, Kennedy "agreed immediately, called McNamara, and over emotional Navy protest, issued the appropriate instructions." [85] "In a sharp clash with the Navy, he made certain his will prevailed." [86] The Navy's blueprint for the blockade was thus changed by drawing the blockade much closer to Cuba. This incident seems to suggest that organizational plans and procedures can be changed by political leaders successfully and at small cost.

A serious organizational orientation makes one suspicious of this account. More careful examination of the available evidence confirms these suspicions, though alternative accounts must be somewhat speculative. According to the public chronology, a quarantine drawn close to Cuba became effective on Wednesday morning, the first Soviet ship was contacted on Thursday morning, and the first boarding of a ship occurred on Friday. According to the statement by the Department of Defense, boarding of the Marcula by a party from the John R. Pierce "took place at 7:50 A.M., E.D.T., 180 miles northeast of Nassau." [87] The Marcula had been trailed since about 10:30 the previous evening. [88] Simple calculations suggest that the Pierce must have been stationed along the Navy's original arc which extended 500 miles out to sea from Cape Magsi, Cuba's eastern most tip. [89] The blockade line was not moved as the President ordered, and the accounts report.

What happened is not entirely clear. One can be certain, however, that Soviet ships passed through the line along which American destroyers had posted themselves before the official "first contact" with the Soviet ship. On October 26 a Soviet tanker arrived in Havana and was welcomed by a dockside rally honoring the crew for "running the

blockade." Photographs of this vessel show the name Vinnita on the side of the vessel in Cyrillic letters.[90] But according to the official U.S. position, the first tanker to pass through the blockade was the Bucharest, which was hailed by the Navy on the morning of October 25. Again simple mathematical calculation excludes the possibility that the Bucharest and the Vinnita were the same ship, since a tanker traveling at 10 to 20 knots could not reach Havana from the blockade line in a single day. It seems quite probable, then that the Navy's resistance to the President's order that the blockade be drawn in closer to Cuba forced the President to allow one or several Soviet ships to pass through the blockade after it was officially operative. [91]

This attempt to leash the Navy's blockade operation had a price. On Wednesday morning, October 24, what the President had been awaiting occurred. The eighteen dry cargo ships heading towards the quarantine stopped dead in the water. This was the occasion of Dean Rusk's remark, "We are eyeball to eyeball and I think the other fellow just blinked." [92] But the Navy had another interpretation. The ships had simply stopped to pick up more Soviet submarine escorts. The President became quite concerned lest the Navy -- already riled because of the leashing of its designed blockade -- blunder into an incident. Sensing the President's fears, McNamara became suspicious of the Navy's organizational procedures and routines for making the first interception. Calling on the Chief of Naval Operations in the Navy's inner sanctum, the Navy Flag Plot, McNamara put his questions harshly.[93] Who would make the first interception? Were Russian-speaking officers on board? How would submarines be dealt with? At one point McNamara asked Anderson what he would do if a Soviet ship's captain refused to answer questions about his cargo. At that point the Navy man picked up the manual of Navy regulations and waving it in McNamara's face, shouted, "It's all in there." To which McNamara replied, "I don't give a damn what John Paul Jones would have done; I want to know what you are going to do, now." [94] The encounter ended on Anderson's remark: "Now, Mr. Secretary, if you and your Deputy will go back to your office the Navy will run the blockade." [95]

IV. MODEL III: BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS

Model II's grasp of government action as organizational output, partially coordinated by a unified group of leaders, provides a salutary antidote to the standard model's efforts at understanding government behavior as actions chosen by a unitary decisionmaker. But the fascination of analysis focused on outputs must not be allowed to blurr a further fact: the "leaders" who sit on top of organizations are not a monolithic group. Rather, each of the individuals in this group is, in his own right, a player in a central, competitive game. The name of the game is bureaucratic politics: bargaining along regularized circuits among players positioned hierarchically within the government. Government behavior can thus be understood according to a third conceptual model, not as organizational output but as outcomes of these bargaining games. In contrast with Model I, the bureaucratic politics model sees no unitary actor but rather many actors as players, who focus not on a single strategic issue but on many diverse intra-national problems as well, in terms of no consistent set of strategic goals and objectives but rather various conceptions of national, organizational, and personal goals, making government decisions not by rational choice but by the pulling and hauling that is politics.*

The apparatus of each national government constitutes a complex arena for the intra-national game. Political leaders at the top of this apparatus plus the men who occupy positions on top of the critical organizations form the circle of central players. Ascendancy to this circle assures some independent standing. The necessary decentralization of decisions required for action on the broad range of foreign policy problems guarantees that each player has considerable baronial discretion. Thus power is shared.

The nature of problems of foreign policy permits fundamental disagreement among reasonable men concerning what ought to be done. Analyses yield conflicting recommendations. Separate responsibilities laid on the shoulders of individual personalities encourage differences in perceptions and priorities. But the issues are of first order importance. What the nation does really matters. A wrong choice could mean irreplicable damage: "nuclear incineration." Thus responsible men are obliged to fight for what they are convinced is right.

Men share power. Men differ concerning what must be done. The differences matter. This milieu necessitates that policy be resolved by politics. What the nation does is sometimes the result of the

* This framework is entitled the bureaucratic politics model. It might have been labeled administrative, internal, governmental, machine, or even palace politics. "Politics" signifies the subtle pulling and hauling in intricate games which characterizes the action. "Bureaucratic" signifies that the action is located in the bureaucratized machine which is the Executive, or Administration, or (in the U.K.) Government.

triumph of one group committed to that course of action over other groups fighting for other alternatives, but more often the resultant of different groups pulling in different directions yielding an outcome distinct from what anyone intended. In either case what moves the chess pieces is not simply the reasons which support a course of action, nor the routines of organizations which enact an alternative, but the power and skill of proponents and opponents of the action in question.

This characterization captures the thrust of the bureaucratic politics orientation. If problems of foreign policy arose as discreet issues, and decisions were determined one game at a time, this account would suffice. But most "issues," e.g. Vietnam or the proliferation of nuclear weapons, emerge piecemeal, over time, one lump in one context, a second in another. Hundreds of issues compete for players' attention every day. Each player is forced to fix upon his issues for that day, fight them on their own terms, and rush on to the next. Thus the character of emerging issues and the pace at which the game is played converge to yield government "decisions" and "actions" as collages. Choices by one player (e.g. to authorize action by his department, to make a speech, or to refrain from acquiring certain information), outcomes of minor games (e.g., the wording of a cable or the decision that a department act bargained out among lower level players), outcomes of central games (e.g., decisions, acts, and speeches bargained out among central players) and "foul-ups" (e.g., issues which are not decided because they are not recognized or are raised too late, misunderstandings, etc.) -- these pieces, when stuck to the same canvas, constitute government behavior relevant to an issue. To explain why one particular formal governmental decision was made or why one pattern of government behavior emerged, it is necessary to identify the games and players, to display the coalitions, bargains, and compromises, and to convey some feel for the confusion which contributed to the foul-ups.

The concept of national security policy as political outcome contradicts both public imagery and academic orthodoxy. Issues vital to national security are too important to be settled by political games. They must be "above" politics. To accuse someone of "playing politics with national security" is a most serious charge. Thus, memoirs typically treat such bargaining with a velvet glove. For example, both Sorensen and Schlesinger present the efforts of the ExCom in the Cuban missile crisis as rational deliberation among a unified group of equals. What public conviction demands, the academic penchant for intellectual elegance reinforces. Internal politics is messy; moreover, according to prevailing doctrine, politicking lacks intellectual content. As such, it constitutes gossip for journalists rather than a subject for serious investigation. Occasional memoirs, anecdotes in historical accounts, and several detailed case studies to the contrary, most of the literature of foreign policy avoids bureaucratic politics.

The gap between academic literature and the experience of participants in government is nowhere wider than at this point. Indeed

these facts: government leaders are competitive players rather than a homogeneous group; priorities and perceptions are shaped by positions in which players sit; problems are more varied than the straightforward strategic issue; management of piecemeal streams of decisions is more critical than steady-state choices; getting the government to do what is right is more difficult than deciding what ought to be done -- constitute for the observant government participant obvious terms and conditions of daily employment. As the first Secretary of Defense, James Forrestal, once observed: "I have always been amused by those who say they are quite willing to go into government but they are not willing to go into politics. My answer...is that you can no more divorce government from politics than you can separate sex from creation." [96]

Several analysts have begun to fill this gap. The paradigm articulated here relies upon this small but increasing number.* But the primary motives for these analysts have been to describe occurrences more adequately, to uncover previously unnoticed activities relevant to an action, or to offer additional insights concerning a particular sequence of events. Little labor has been invested in squeezing these insights into propositions. Systematic investigation of major players' games, categories of decisions and actions, and the "fine print" of bureaucratic politics is required. Until this work is more advanced the bureaucratic politics paradigm can be no more than a tentative formalization of an orientation.

BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS PARADIGM

I. Basic Unit of Analysis: Policy as Political Outcome.

The decisions and actions of governments are essentially intra-national political outcomes: outcomes in the sense that what happens is not chosen as a solution to a problem but is rather the resultant

* My primary source is the model implicit in the work of Richard E. Neustadt, though his concentration on presidential action has been generalized to a concern with policy as the outcome of political bargaining among a number of independent players, the President amounting to no more than a "superpower" among many lesser but considerable powers. [97] As Warner Shilling argues, the substantive problems are of such inordinate difficulty that uncertainties and differences with regard to goals, alternatives, and consequences are inevitable. [98] This necessitates what Roger Hilsman describes as the process of conflict and consensus building. [99] The technique employed in this process often resemble those used in legislative assemblies, though Samuel Huntington's contention that the process is "legislative" overemphasizes the equality of participants as opposed to hierarchy which structures the game. [100] Moreover, whereas for Huntington, foreign policy (in contrast to military policy) is set by the executive, this paradigm maintains that the activities which he describes as legislative are characteristic of the process by which foreign policy is made.

of compromise, coalition, competition, and confusion among government officials many of whom are focusing on different faces of the issue; political in the sense that the activity from which the outcomes emerge is best characterized as bargaining along regularized circuits among individual members of the government. Following Wittgenstein's employment of concept of a "game", national inputs into international affairs can be conceived as outcomes of intricate and subtle, simultaneous, overlapping games among players located in positions, the hierachial arrangement of which constitutes the government.* These games proceed neither at random nor at leisure. Regular circuits structure the game. Deadlines force issues to the attention of incredibly busy players. The moves, sequences of moves, and games of chess are thus to be explained in terms of the bargaining among players with separate and unequal power over particular pieces and with separable objectives in distinguishable subgames.

II. Focal Concepts

1. Players in Positions. The actor is neither a unitary nation, nor a conglomerate of organizations, but rather a number of individual players. Groups of these players constitute the agent for particular government decisions and actions. Players are men in jobs.

Individuals become players in the national security policy game by occupying a critical position in an administration. For example, in the U.S. government the players include "Chiefs": the President, Secretaries of State, Defense, and Treasury, Director of the CIA, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and, since 1961, the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs;[101] "Staffers": the immediate staff of each Chief; "Indians": the political appointees and permanent government officials within each of the departments and agencies; and "Ad Hoc Players": actors in the wider government game (especially "Congressional Influentials"), members of the press, spokesmen for important interest groups (especially the "bipartisan foreign policy establishment" in and out of Congress), and surrogates for each of these groups. Other members of the Congress, press, interest groups,

* The theatrical metaphor of stage, roles, and actors is more common than this metaphor of games, positions, and players. Nevertheless, the rigidity connoted by the concept of "role" both in the theatrical sense of actors reciting fixed lines and in the socio-logical sense of fixed responses to spccified social situations makes the concepts of games, positions, and players more useful for this analysis of active participants in the determination of national foreign policy. Objections to the terminology on the grounds that "game" connotes non-serious play overlook the concept's application to most serious problems both in Wittgenstein's philosophy and in contemporary game theory. Game theory typically treats more precisely structured games, but Wittgenstein's examination of the "language game" wherein men use words to communicate is quite analogous to this analysis of the less specified game of bureaucratic politics. Wittgenstein's employment of this concept forms a central strand in his Philosophical Investigations. See Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, and Thomas C. Schelling, "What is Game Theory?" in James Charlesworth, Contemporary Political Analysis.

and public form concentric circles around the central arena -- circles which demarcate the permissive limits within which the game is played.

Positions define what players both may, and must, do. The advantages and handicaps with which each player can enter and play in various games stems from his position. So does a cluster of obligations for the performance of certain tasks. The two sides of this coin are illustrated by the position of the modern Secretary of State. First, in form and usually in fact, he is the primary repository of political judgment on the political-military issues which are the stuff of contemporary foreign policy; consequently, he is a senior personal adviser to the President. Second, he is the colleague of the President's other senior advisers on problems of foreign policy, the Secretaries of Defense and Treasury, and the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs. Third, he is the ranking U.S. diplomat for serious negotiation. Fourth, he serves as an administration voice to Congress, the country, and the world. Finally, he is "Mr. State Department" or "Mr. Foreign Office", "leader of officials, spokesman for their causes, guardian of their interests, judge of their disputes, superintendent of their work, master of their careers." [102] But he is not first one, and then the other. All of these responsibilities are his simultaneously. His performance in one affects his credit and power in the others. The perspective stemming from the daily work which he must oversee--the cable traffic by which his department maintains relations with other foreign offices--conflicts with the President's requirement that he serve as a generalist and coordinator of contrasting perspectives. The necessity that he be close to the President restricts the extent to which, and the force with which, he can front for his department. When he defers to the Secretary of Defense rather than fighting for his department's position--as he often must--he strains the loyalty of his officialdom. In the words of one of his Indians: "loyalty is hilly, and it has to go down if it is going to go up." [103] Thus he labors under the weight of conflicting responsibilities. The Secretary's resolution of these conflicts depends not only upon the position, but also upon the player who occupies the position.

For players are also people. Men's metabolisms differ. The hard core of the bureaucratic politics mix is personality. How each man manages to stand the heat in his kitchen, each player's basic operating style, and the complementarity or contradiction among personalities and styles in the inner circles are irreducible pieces of the policy blend. Moreover, each person comes to his position with baggage in tow. These bags include sensitivities to certain issues, commitments to various programs, and personal standing and debts with groups in the society.

2. Parochial Priorities, Perceptions, and Issues. Answers to the question: What is the issue? are colored by the position from which the question is considered. Propensities inherent in positions do not facilitate unanimity in answer to the question: What must be done? For the factors which encourage organizational parochialism also exert pressure upon the players who occupy positions on top of (or within) these organizations. To motivate members of his organization, a player must be sensitive to the organization's orientation. The games into

which the player can enter and the advantages with which he plays enhance these pressures. Thus propensities of perception and priorities stemming from position are sufficient to permit reliable prediction in many cases. But these propensities are filtered through the baggage which players bring to positions. Sensitivity to both the pressures and the baggage is thus required for many predictions.

3. Power and Stakes. Games are played to determine outcomes. But outcomes advance and impede each player's conception of the national interest, his organization's interests, specific programs to which he is committed, the welfare of his friends, and his personal interests. These overlapping interests constitute the stakes for which games are played.

Each player's ability to play successfully depends upon his power. Power, i.e., effective influence on policy outcomes, is an elusive blend of at least three elements: bargaining advantages (drawn from formal authority and responsibility, institutional backing, constituents, expertise, and status), skill and will in using bargaining advantages, and other players' perceptions of the first two ingredients. Power wisely invested yields an enhanced reputation for effectiveness. Unsuccessful investment deplete both the stock of capital and the reputation. Thus each player must pick the issues on which he can play with high probability of success. But no player's power is sufficient to guarantee satisfactory outcomes. Each player's needs and fears runs to every other player. What ensues is the most intricate and subtle of games known to man.

4. The Problem and the Problems. "Solutions" to strategic problems are not derived by detached analysts focusing coolly on the problem. Rather, deadlines and events raise issues in games, and demand decisions of incredibly busy players in contexts which significantly influence the face that the issue wears. The problems for the players are both narrower and broader than the strategic problem. For each player focuses not on the total strategic problem but rather on the decision which must be made now. But each decision has critical consequences not only for the strategic problem but for each player's organizational, reputational, and personal stakes. Thus the gap between what the player was focusing on (the problems which he was solving) and the problem upon which the analyst focuses is so wide that it may be unbridgeable.

5. Circuits. The bargaining games do not proceed randomly. Circuits, i.e., regularized ways of producing action concerning types of issues, structure the game by pre-selecting the major players, determining their points of entrance into the game, and distributing particular advantages and disadvantages for each game. Most critically, circuits determine "who's got the action," that is, which department's Indians actually do whatever is decided. Issues typically arise within, and are determined according to, one of the established channels for producing action concerning an issue of a particular sort. In the national security area, weapons procurement decisions are made within the annual budgeting process; embassies' demands for action cables are

answered according to routines of consultation and clearance from State to Defense and White House; requests for instructions from military groups (concerning assistance all the time, during war-time concerning operations) are composed by the military in consultation with the Office of Secretary of Defense, State, and White House; crisis responses are debated among White House, State, Defense, CIA, Treasury, and Ad Hoc players; major political speeches, especially by the President but also by other Chiefs, are cleared through established channels.

6. Action as Politics. Government decisions are made and government actions emerge neither as the calculated choice of a unified group, nor as a formal summary of leaders' preferences. Rather the context of shared power but separate judgments concerning important choices, determines that politics is the mechanism of choice. Each player pulls and hauls with the power at his discretion for outcomes which will advance his conception of national, organizational, group, and personal interests.

The environment in which the game is played: inordinate uncertainty concerning what must be done, the necessity that something be done, and crucial consequences of what is done -- force responsible men to become active players. The pace of the game: hundreds of issues, numerous games, and multiple circuits -- compels players to fight to "get other's attention," to make them "see the facts," to assure that they "take the time to think seriously about the broader issue." The structure of the game: power shared by individuals with separate responsibilities -- validates each player's feeling that "others don't see my problem," and "others must be persuaded to look at the issue from a less parochial perspective." The rules of the game: he who hesitates loses -- is chance to play at that point; he who is uncertain about his recommendation is overpowered by others who are sure -- pressures players to come down on one side of a 51-49 issue and play. The rewards of the game: effectiveness, i.e., impact on outcomes, as the immediate measure of performance -- encourages hard play. Thus, most players come to fight to "make the government do what is right." The strategies and tactics employed are quite similar to those formalized by theorists of international relations.

Advocates fight for outcomes. But the game of politics does not consist simply of players pulling and hauling, each for his own chosen action. For the terms and conditions of players' employment are not identical. Barons and Indians are often advocates of particular actions. But the staffers of Barons fight to find issues, state alternatives, and produce arguments for their Chiefs. Presidential staffers -- ideally -- struggle to catch issues and structure games so as to maximize both the President's appreciation of advocates' arguments and the impact of Presidential decision. Moreover, Chiefs sometimes function as semi-staffers for the President. The President's costs and benefits often require that he decide as little as possible, and keep his options

open (rather than decide on an uncertain issue and play hard). The game is, therefore, subtle, and an understanding of the play requires sensitivity to the "fine print".

7. Streams of Outcomes. Important government decisions or actions rarely emerge as steady-state outcomes of a single game. Rather, what the government does is a collage composed of individual acts, outcomes of minor and major games, and foul-ups. Outcomes which could never have been chosen by an actor and would never have emerged from bargaining in a single game over the issue, are fabricated piece by piece. Understanding of the outcome requires that it be disaggregated.

Sophisticated players appreciate that each piece of the picture is but a piece, and adjust their play accordingly. Players concerned with the aggregate work of art must attempt to manage the stream of acts, outcomes, and foul-ups, though this is the most difficult aspect of the game of politics.

III. Dominant Inference Pattern

If a nation performed an action, that action was the outcome of bargaining among individuals and groups within the government. That outcome included results of the triumph in the bargaining groups committed to a decision or action, resultants which emerged from bargaining among groups with quite different positions and foul-ups. Model III's explanatory power is achieved by revealing the pulling and hauling of various players, with different perceptions and priorities, focusing on separate problems, which yielded the outcomes that constitute the action in question.

IV. General Propositions

1. Action and Intention. Action does not presuppose intention. The sum of behavior of representatives of a government relevant to an issue was rarely intended by any individual or group. Rather separate individuals with different intentions contributed pieces which compose an outcome distinct from what anyone would have chosen.

2. Where you stand depends on where you sit. [104] Horizontally, the diverse demands upon each player shape his priorities, perceptions, and issues. For large classes of issues, e.g., budgets and procurement decisions, the stance of a particular player can be predicted with high reliability from information concerning his seat. For example, though the participants in the notorious B-36 controversy were, as Eisenhower put it, "distinguished Americans who have their country's good at heart," no one was surprised by Admiral Radford's testimony that "the B-36 under any theory of war, is a bad gamble with national security," as opposed to Air Force Secretary Symington's claim that "a B-36 with an A-bomb can take off from this continent and destroy distant objectives which might require ground armies years to take and then only at the expense of heavy casualties." [105]

3. Chiefs and Indians. The aphorism "where you stand depends on where you sit" has vertical as well as horizontal application. Vertically, the demands upon the President, Chiefs, Staffers, and Indians are quite distinct, first in the case of policy making, and second in the case of implementation.

The foreign policy issues with which the President can deal are limited primarily by his crowded schedule: the necessity of dealing first with what comes next. His problem is to probe the special face worn by issues that come to his attention, to preserve his leeway until time has clarified the uncertainties, and to assess the relevant risks.

Foreign policy Chiefs deal most often with the hottest issue de jour, though, they can get the attention of the President and other members of the government for an issue which they take to be important. What they cannot guarantee is that "the President will pay the price" or that "the others will get on board." They must build a coalition of the relevant powers that be. They must "give the President confidence" in the choice of the right course of action.

Most problems are framed, alternatives specified, and proposals pushed, however, by Indians. Indians' fights with Indians of other departments, for example, struggles between International Security Affairs of the Department of Defense and Political-Military of the State Department are a microcosm of the action at higher levels. But the Indian's major problem is how to get the attention of Chiefs, how to get an issue on an action circuit, how to get the government "to do what is right." All of the incentives push the Indian to become an active advocate.

In policy making then, the issue looking down is options: how to preserve my leeway until time clarifies uncertainties. The issue looking sideways is commitment: how to get others committed to my coalition. The issue looking upwards is confidence: how to give the boss confidence in doing what must be done. To paraphrase one of Neustadt's assertions which can be applied down the length of the ladder, the essence of a responsible official's task is to induce others to come to see that what needs to be done is what their own appraisal of their own responsibilities requires them to do in their own interests.

For implementation of foreign policy decisions, vertical demands differ. The Chief's requirements are two, but the two conflict. The necessity that he build a consensus behind his preferred policy frequently requires fuzziness. Different people must agree with slightly different things for quite different reasons. When a government decision is made, both the character of the choice and the reasons for the choice must often remain vague. But this requirement is at loggerheads with a second demand. The necessity that choice be enacted requires that footdragging by the unenthusiastic, and

subversion by the opposed, be kept to a minimum. Conviction of foot-draggers and subversives constitutes a difficult task when the decision is clear and the watchman is the President. Where decisions are fuzzed -- as the first requirement demands -- this task strains even the resources of the President. Moreover, most oversight, policing, and spurring is done not be the President but by the President's men or the men who agree with the government decision. Men who would move the elements of the government to act on what has been decided demand clarity.

V. Specific Propositions

1. Deterrence. The probability of nuclear attack depends primarily on the probability of attack emerging as an outcome of the bureaucratic politics of the attacking government. This latter probability is composed of a number of elements of the game in the politics of the attacking government. First, which players can decide to launch an attack? Whether the effective power over action is controlled by an individual, a minor game, or the central game is critical. Second, though Model I's confidence in deterrence stems from an assertion that, in the end, nations will not commit suicide, Model III recalls the carcasses of national suicides with which history is strewn. Admiral Yamamoto, who designed the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, estimated accurately: "In the first six months to a year of war against the U.S. and England I will run wild, and I will show you an uninterrupted succession of victories; I must also tell you that, should the war be prolonged for two or three years, I have no confidence in our ultimate victory." [106] But Japan attacked. Thus, three questions must be considered. One: could any member of the government solve his problem by attack? What patterns of bargaining could yield attack as an outcome? The major difference between a well understood stable balance of terror and a questionable balance may simply be that most members of the government appreciate fully the consequences of attack in the case of the former and are thus on guard against the emergence of this outcome. Two: what stream of outcomes might lead to an attack? At what point in that stream is the potential attacker's politics? If members of the U.S. government had been sensitive to the stream of decisions from which the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor emerged, they would have been aware of a considerable probability of that attack. Three: how might miscalculation and confusion generate foul-ups that yield attack as an outcome? For example, in a crisis or after the beginning of conventional war, what happens to the information available to, and the effective power of, members of the central game.

A third element of importance to attacks are probable differences in perceptions and priorities of central leaders. Pressures encourage both the Soviet Chairman and the U.S. President to feel differences between their own perspectives and responsibilities and those of other members of their central games. For each lives with the daily responsibility for nuclear holocaust. Neither of them will likely perceive large differences between the death of one-million

and one-hundred million of his own citizens when choosing to take, or refrain from taking, a risk. Each will be more sensitive to the other's problem (than is any other member of the central game). Both may well appreciate the extent to which the "kings" are partners in the game against nuclear disaster. Both will be interested in private communication with each other. If channels can be arranged, such communication offers the most promising prospect of resolution of a crisis.

2. Sovietology. Particular Soviet actions are outcomes of Soviet bureaucratic politics.

A. Force Posture. The broad outlines of Soviet force posture are established as outcomes of bargaining in the central Soviet game. The dominant feature of bureaucratic politics in the Soviet Union is that the "struggle for power" is continuous. Occupation of positions in the central game is always uncertain and risky. Members of the Politburo and Central Committee are aware of the historical tendency for one man to assume considerable power. Thus while a central part of life for the leader is how to stay on top, a large part of the problem for Politburo members is how to keep the leadership collective. This characteristic yields a relevant proposition: policy issues are inextricably intertwined with power plays. To reorganize is to redistribute advantages and disadvantages in the central game. Shifts in the resource allocations constitute shifts in the power of central players. Force posture levels emerge from this game. So do crucial decisions to restrict resources and thus, perhaps, not to procure a large first-generation ICBM force (thus preventing the "missile gap").

VI. Evidence

Information concerning the details of differences in perceptions and priorities within a government on a particular issue is rarely available. Accurate accounts of the bargaining which yielded a resolution of the issue are rarer still. Documents do not capture this kind of information. What the documents do preserve tends to obscure as much as to enlighten. Thus the source of this information must be the participants themselves. But, ex hypothesis, each participant knows one small piece of the story. Memories quickly become colored. Diaries are often misleading. What is required is access to a large number of the participants in a decision before their memories fade or become too badly discolored, by an analyst attuned to the players and sensitive to bureaucratic politics. Such access is uncommon. But without this information, how can the analyst proceed? As a master of this style of analysis has stated, "If I were forced to choose between the documents on the one hand, and late, limited, partial interviews with some of the principal participants on the other, I would be forced to discard the documents." [107] The use of public documents, newspapers, interviews of participants, and discussion of close observers of participants to piece together the bits of information available is an art. Transfer of these skills from the fingertips of artists to an outline which can guide other students of foreign policy is this model's most pressing need.

THE U.S. IMPOSITION OF A BLOCKADE

The Politics of Discovery. The Ex Com's choice of the blockade cannot be understood apart from the context in which the necessity for choice arose. A series of overlapping bargaining games determined both the date of the discovery of the Soviet missiles and the impact of this discovery on the administration. An explanation of the politics of the discovery is consequently a considerable piece of the explanation of the U.S. blockade.

Cuba was the Kennedy administration's "political Achilles' heel."^[108] Sensitivity stemmed from three quite separable sources. First, the Bay of Pigs operation in April, 1961 raised the most serious internal doubts about the President's judgment, the wisdom of his advisors, and the quality of their advice. No subsequent major issue of national security was decided without the inclusion of Theodore Sorenson and the President's brother, Robert Kennedy. When the President referred to Cuba as his "heaviest political cross," he referred to the inside of his administration as well as the outside.^[109] Second, to initiate Cuba I was to teach the public unfortunate lessons: that Cuba constituted a serious threat to U.S. security; that calls for the overthrow of Castro's Communism had some legitimacy; that U.S. policy could cater to hawkish appetites. Third, by attempting to overthrow Castro but then bungling the job, at least in part because of dovish squeamishness, the President and his advisors were left standing in a position not unlike Chamberlain's after Czechoslovakia. Having been tried and found wanting once, the pressures to overreact in the next case would be overwhelming.

The Republican Party did not miss the administration's vulnerability over Cuba. The months preceding the Cuban missile crisis were also months before the off-year Congressional elections. The Republican Senatorial and Congressional Campaigns Committee announced that Cuba would be "the dominant issue of the 1962 campaign."^[110] What the administration billed as a "more positive and indirect approach of isolating Castro from the developing, democratic Latin America," Senators Keating, Goldwater, Capehart, Thurmond, and others attacked as a "do-nothing" policy.^[111] In statements on the floor of the House and Senate, campaign speeches across the country, and interviews and articles carried by national news media, Cuba - particularly the Soviet program of increased arms aid - served as a stick for stirring the domestic political scene.^[112] In contrast to the administration's inaction which was resulting only in additional Soviet arms shipments to Cuba, critics called for a blockade, an invasion, or simply "action."

These attacks drew blood. Prudence demanded a vigorous administration reaction. Every headline about Cuba, every critic's cry -- no matter how wild -- flaunted the administration's heel. The President decided to meet the issue head-on. His best hope was to overwhelm the critics by a barrage of official statements disclaiming any Soviet provocation in Cuba and thus deflating his opponent's case. Thus the administration conducted a forceful campaign of denial designed to discredit critics' claims. The President himself manned the front line of

this offensive, though almost all administration officials participated. In his news conference on August 19, President Kennedy attacked as "irresponsible" calls for an invasion of Cuba, stressing rather "the totality of our obligations" and promising to "watch what happens in Cuba with the closest attention."^[113] On September 4, he issued a strong statement denying any provocative Soviet action in Cuba.^[114] On September 13 he lashed out at "loose talk" calling for an invasion of Cuba.^[115] The day before the flight of the U-2 which discovered the missiles, he campaigned in Capehart's Indiana against those "self-appointed generals and admirals who want to send someone else's sons to war."^[116]

Under Secretary of State George Ball testified before a Congressional Committee on October 3:

Our intelligence is very good and very hard. All the indications are that this is equipment which is basically of a defensive capability and it does not offer any offensive capability to Cuba as against the United States or the other nations of the Hemisphere...We have no evidence that there are any surface to air missiles in Cuba.^[117]

On Sunday, October 14, on ABC's Issues and Answers Presidential assistant McGeorge Bundy was denying the presence of Soviet offensive missiles in Cuba -- just as a U-2 was taking its first pictures of them. In response to Edward P. Morgan's probing about the "interpretation of the military installations in Cuba which the administration emphasizes are defensive in nature and not offensive" Bundy asserted:

I know that there is no present evidence, and I think that there is no present likelihood that the Cubans and the Cuban government and the Soviet government would, in combination, attempt to install a major offensive capability.^[118]

When Assistant Secretary of State Edwin Martin was called on Monday evening, October 15 to be informed of the U.S. discovery of missiles, he was on the platform delivering a speech to the National Press Club. The address was an extended assertion that Soviet buildup in Cuba was "basically defensive in character."^[119]

In this campaign to puncture the critics' charges and to reassure the public, the administration soon discovered that more than denials were required. The public needed positive slogans. Thus, Kennedy fell into a tenuous semantic distinction between "offensive" and "defensive" weapons. This distinction originated in Kennedy's September 4 statement which asserted that there was no evidence of "offensive ground to ground missiles" and warned "were it to be otherwise, the gravest issues would arise."^[120] His September 13 statement turned on this distinction between "defensive" and "offensive" weapons and announced a firm

commitment to action if the Soviet Union attempted to introduce the latter into Cuba.[121] Congressional committees elicited from administration officials testimony which read both this distinction and the President's commitment into the Congressional Record.[122]

This is a classic illustration of the effect of the "backdrop," i.e., the opposition and Congressional committees, on policy making. A number of Republicans tried to make electoral capital of this foreign policy issue, but provoked a response which had significant consequences for U.S. policy. To most of the Congressional participants, the character of this response was unanticipated and irrelevant to their purposes. For several skilled Congressional players, however, the venture was a success: the administration was pinned down on response to Soviet offensive missiles in Cuba, the President's options were narrowed. But an equally important, more subtle, and less noted effect of this "action in the wings" occurred within the games inside the administration.

What the President least wanted to hear, the CIA was most hesitant to say plainly. On August 22 before the administration campaign against the critics had begun, John McCone met privately with the President and voiced suspicions that the Soviets were preparing to introduce offensive missiles into Cuba.[123] Kennedy heard this as what it was: the suspicion of a hawk. McCone left Washington for a month's honeymoon on the Riviera. Fretting at Cap Ferrat, he bombarded his deputy, General Marshall Carter, with telegrams on September 7, 10, 13 and 16.[124] But Carter, knowing that McCone had informed the President of his suspicions and received a cold reception, was reluctant to distribute these telegrams outside the CIA.[125] Early in September an American U-2 strayed over Siberia for nine minutes.[126] On September 9 a U-2 flown by Chinese Nationalists was downed over mainland China.[127] When the Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance (COMOR) convened on September 10, there was a sense of urgency.[128] Loss of another U-2 might incite world opinion to demand cancellation of U-2 flights. The intelligence community was concerned for the life of its "eyes". The President's campaign against critics' claims of Soviet provocation in Cuba had begun. To risk the downing of a U-2 over Cuba was to risk chopping off the limb on which the President was sitting. That meeting thus decided to shy away from the western end of Cuba (where SAM's were becoming operational) and modify the flight pattern of the U-2's in order to reduce the probability that a U-2 would be lost.[129]

The United States Intelligence Board (USIB) met on September 12 to approve the estimate concerning Soviet offensive missiles in Cuba. [130] The draft which they approved suggested both the bargaining from which the draft had emerged and the sensitivity of the players to the spectrum of issues. On September 13 the President had asserted that there were no Soviet offensive missiles in Cuba and committed his administration to action if offensive missiles were discovered. Administration officials being called to testify before Congressional committees were denying that there was any evidence whatever of offensive missiles in Cuba. The implications of a National Intelligence

Estimate which concluded that the Soviets were introducing offensive missiles into Cuba were not lost on the men who constituted America's highest intelligence assembly. Though McCone was quite convinced that the Soviets were introducing missiles into Cuba, he was on the Riviera. The President had heard the hypothesis, so Deputy Director Carter was reluctant to come forward without harder evidence than was then available. Given this climate of opinion and cluster of considerations, on the basis of the information available USIB unanimously adopted the proposed National Intelligence Estimate.

The necessity of official intra-government adherence to administration guidelines led some members of the military and intelligence communities who disagreed with the administration position to resort to unofficial channels, particularly the Congress and the Press. Senator Keating, Representative Kitchin, and others were receiving information from within the administration. To insure against leaks if intelligence on offensive weapons did become available, President Kennedy ordered special security arrangements, including a special code, PSALM, which restricted information concerning offensive weapons to a limited number who had special need to know.[131]

The October 4 COMOR decision to direct a flight over the western end of Cuba in effect "overturned" the September estimate, without, however, officially raising that issue. This decision represented McCone's victory for which he had lobbied with the President before the September 10 decision, in telegrams before the September 19 estimate, and in person after his return to Washington. Though the politics of the intelligence community is closely guarded, several pieces of the story can be told.[132] By September 27, Colonel Wright and others in CIA believed that the Soviet Union was placing missiles in the San Cristobal area.[133] This area was marked suspicious by the CIA on September 29 and certified top priority on October 3. By October 4 McCone had the evidence required to raise the issue officially. The members of COMOR heard McCone's argument, but were reluctant to make the hard decision which he demanded. American overflight of the western end of Cuba was a matter of real concern. There was a significant probability that a U-2 would be downed. This hesitancy accounts for the ten day delay between decision and flight, but the details of that bargaining must be held in abeyance.

The Politics of Issues. When the U-2 photographs presented incontrovertible evidence of the presence of Soviet offensive missiles in Cuba on October 15, what was the issue? This revelation fell upon highly politicized players in an extraordinarily complex context. The impact was stunning. As one high official recalls, Khrushchev had caught us "with our pants down." What each of the central participants saw, and what each did to cover both his one and the administration's nakedness, provided a spectrum of issues and answers.

At approximately 9:00 A.M., Tuesday morning, October 16, McGeorge Bundy went to the President's living quarters with the message: "Mr. President, there is now hard photographic evidence that the Russians

have offensive missiles in Cuba."^[134] Much has been made of Kennedy's "expression of surprise."^[134a] But "surprise" fails to capture the character of his initial reaction. Rather, it was one of startled anger, most adequately conveyed by the exclamation: "He can't do that to me!"^[135] That exclamation in this context was double-barreled. First, in terms of the President's attention and priorities at that moment, Khrushchev had chosen the most unhelpful act of all. In a highly sensitive domestic political context where the opponents demanded action against the Soviet interests in Cuba, Kennedy was following a policy of reason and responsibility. In support of that policy, he had drawn a distinction between "defensive" and "offensive" weapons, staked his full Presidential authority on the assertion that the Soviets were not placing offensive weapons in Cuba, and warned unambiguously that offensive missiles would not be tolerated.^[136] Second, the major thrust of his administration's policy towards the Soviet Union had been one of relaxing tension and building trust through trust. At considerable political cost, he was attempting to leash the anti-Communist Cold Warriors and to educate both members of the government and the public out of prevailing devil theories of Soviet Communism. Moreover, he, and his closest advisers, had made every possible effort to guarantee that all communication between the President and the Chairman would be straightforward and accurate. Contact had been made. Khrushchev was reciprocating. Mutual confidence was growing. As part of this exchange, Khrushchev had assured the President through the most direct and personal channels that he was aware of the President's domestic political problem and that nothing would be done to exacerbate this problem. Specifically, Khrushchev had given the President solemn, trustworthy assurances that the Soviet Union was not importing offensive missiles into Cuba.^[137] But then this. The Chairman had lied to the President.

Kennedy's initial reaction entailed action. The missiles must be removed.^[138] The alternatives of "doing nothing" or "taking a diplomatic approach" could not have been more irrelevant to his problem.

These two tracks - doing nothing and taking a diplomatic approach - were the solutions advocated by two of his principal advisors, to the issues they perceived. For Secretary of Defense McNamara, the missiles raised the spectre of nuclear war. To combat this spectre, he first framed the issue as a straightforward strategic problem. To understand the issue, one had to grasp two obvious, but difficult points. First, the missiles represented an inevitable occurrence: narrowing of the missile gap. It simply happened sooner rather than later. Second, the United States could accept this occurrence since its consequences were minor: "seven-to-one missile 'superiority,' one-to-one missile 'equality,' one-to-seven missile 'inferiority' -- the three postures are nearly identical." McNamara's statement of this argument at the first meeting of the ExCom was summed up in the phrase, "a missile is a missile."^[139] "It makes no great difference," he maintained, "whether you are killed by a missile from the Soviet Union or Cuba."^[140] The implication was clear. The United States should not initiate a crisis with the Soviet Union, risking a

probability of nuclear war (which the President estimated was between one to three and even) over an occurrence which had such small strategic implications.

The perceptions of McGeorge Bundy, the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs, are the most difficult of all to reconstruct. There is no question that he initially argued for a diplomatic track.[141] The Soviet Union should be arraigned before the court of world opinion and the United States should appeal to the United Nations or the Organization of American States for an inspection team. This should not be made an issue between the United States and the Soviet Union. But was Bundy laboring under his acknowledged burden of responsibility in Cuba I? Or was he rather playing the role of devil's advocate in order to make the President probe his own initial reaction and consider other options?

The President's brother, Robert Kennedy, saw more clearly than McNamara the political wall against which Khrushchev had backed the President. But like McNamara, the issue for Robert Kennedy was the prospect of nuclear doom. Was Khrushchev going to force the President to an unreasonable act? Was his brother going to be the American Tojo? At the first meeting of the ExCom, he scribbled a note, "Now I know how Tojo felt when he was planning Pearl Harbor." [142] From the outset he probed for an alternative that would prevent the air strike.

The initial reaction of Theodore Sorensen, the President's Special Counsel and "alter ego," especially for major speeches, fell somewhere between that of the President and his brother. Like the President, Sorensen felt the poignancy of betrayal. If the President was the architect of the policy which the missiles punctured, Sorensen was the draftsman. Khrushchev's deceitful move demanded a strong counter-move. But like Robert Kennedy, Sorensen feared lest the shock and disgrace lead to disaster.

To the Joint Chiefs of Staff the issue was clear. Now was the time to do the job for which they had been preparing contingency plans. Cuba I had been badly done; Cuba II would not be. The missiles provided the occasion to deal with the issue: ridding the Western Hemisphere of Castro's Communism. As the President recalled on the day the crisis ended, "An invasion would have been a mistake -- a wrong use of our power. But the military are mad. They wanted to do this. It's lucky for us that we have McNamara over there." [143]

Rusk's reaction was summed up in a phrase: "This is it." [144] He represented the council of doom, predicting that "if we take a strong stand the allies and Latin Americans will turn against us and if we take a weak action, they will turn away from us," [145] and coining alarming phrases, for example, "nuclear incineration." It was Rusk who remarked on the morning after the President's announcement of the crisis to the world, "We have won a considerable victory. You and I are still alive." [146] But he never wavered from his conviction that "we must see it through," whatever the consequences.

McCone's perceptions flowed from his confirmed prediction. As the Cassandra of the incident, he argued forcefully that the Soviets had employed the missiles in a daring political probe which the United States must meet with force. The time for an air strike was now.[147]

Thus, the missiles posed no "issue." The players who gathered at the pinnacle of the U.S. Government perceived many faces of quite different issues. Yet this group was assembled to choose one American response.

The Politics of Choice. At the outset of the crisis, the individuals who convened at the President's discretion as the ExCom, whistled many different tunes. Before the final decision was made and the vote taken, the majority whistled a single tune: the blockade. The process by which this outcome emerged is a story of the most subtle and intricate probing, pulling, and hauling; leading, guiding, and spurring. Reconstruction of this process can only be tentative.

Initially, the President wanted the clean, surgical air strike. On Tuesday, when he informed Stevenson of the missiles, he mentioned only two alternatives: "I suppose the alternatives are to go in by air and wipe them out, or to take other steps to render them inoperable." [148] Stevenson was so stunned by what seemed to be the President's decision that he delivered a distressed, ambivalent, handwritten note to the President early Wednesday morning. The note warned that: "To risk starting a nuclear war is bound to be divisive at best, and the judgments of history seldom coincide with the tempers of the moment. . . I confess I have many misgivings about the proposed course of action." [149] But neither Stevenson nor his argument carried much weight. Indeed, what prevented the air strike was a fortuitous coincidence of a number of factors -- the absence of any one of which might have prevented blockade of the air strike.

First, McNamara's vision of the spectre set him firmly against the air strike. His initial attempt to frame the issue in strategic terms struck Kennedy as particularly inappropriate, given the President's problem. Once McNamara had appreciated that the name of the game was a strong response, however, he and his deputy Gilpatric conceived of the blockade as a fallback. When this Secretary of Defense -- whose department had the action, whose reputation in the Cabinet was unequalled, in whom the President had demonstrated full confidence -- marshalled the arguments for the blockade and refused to be moved, the blockade became a formidable alternative.

Second, Robert Kennedy -- the President's closest confidant -- was unwilling to have his brother become a "Tojo." His arguments against the air strike on moral grounds struck a chord in the President. Moreover, once his brother had stated these arguments so forcefully, the President could not have persisted in his preferred course without, in effect, agreeing to become what RFK had condemned.

The President learned of the missiles on Tuesday morning. On Wednesday morning, in order not to suggest to the Russians that we had discovered anything, the President flew to Connecticut to keep a campaign commitment, leaving RFK as the unofficial chairman of the group. By the time the President returned on Wednesday evening, a critical third piece had been added to the picture. McNamara had presented his argument for the blockade. Robert Kennedy and Sorensen had joined McNamara. A powerful coalition of the advisors in whom the President had the greatest confidence, and with whom his style was most compatible, had emerged.

Fourth, the coalition that had formed behind the President's initial preference gave him cause to pause. Who supported the air strike -- the Chiefs, McCone, Rusk, Nitze, and Acheson -- more than how they supported it, counted.

Fifth, a piece of inaccurate information, which no one probed, permitted the blockade advocates to fuel (potential) uncertainties in the President's mind. When the President returned to Washington Wednesday evening, RFK and Sorensen met him at the airport. Sorensen gave the President a four-page memorandum outlining the areas of agreement and disagreement. The strongest argument was that the air strike simply could not be surgical.[150] After a day of prodding and questioning, the Air Force had asserted that a surgical air strike limited to the missiles alone could not be chosen with high confidence. What the Air Force was preparing under the rubric "air strike" was something quite different: a major attack.[151] The President may have recalled shades of Cuba I. In any case, once the surgical air strike which he wanted had been declared a null option, he decided not to attend that evening's session of the ExCom, but rather to ponder the coalition's argument for the blockade.

On Thursday, discussion in the ExCom continued, without the President. Some of the members of the ExCom, however, met with the President that morning and afternoon. Thursday evening the ExCom convened not at the State Department, but at The White House, with the President. Kennedy declared his tentative choice of the blockade and directed that preparation be made to put it into effect by Monday morning.[152] Though he raised the question concerning the possibility of a surgical air strike again subsequently, he seems to have accepted the experts' opinion that this was no live option.[153] (Acceptance of this estimate suggests that he may have learned the lesson of the Bay of Pigs, "Never rely on experts," less well than he supposed.[154]) But this information was incorrect. During the second week of the crisis, civilian experts examined the surgical air strike option, discovered that it could be chosen with high confidence, and thus added it to the list of possible choices for the end of the second week. That no one probed this estimate earlier poses an interesting question for further investigation.

A coalition, including the President, thus emerged from the President's initial decision that something be done; McNamara, Robert

Kennedy, and Sorensen's resistance to the air strike; incompatibility between the President and the air strike advocates; and in inaccurate piece of information. To get from this coalition to a government decision, the coalition had to get the air strike advocates on board.

RFK and Sorensen were the engineers of consensus. Acheson, the leader of the air strike camp, had attacked the Attorney General bitterly in a previous meeting. He received an invitation from The White House.[155] The President listened to Acheson's argument, but left no question in Acheson's mind about where the buck stopped. On Friday as the President prepared to leave for a weekend of campaigning, the Joint Chiefs of Staff delayed his flight in order to press their argument.[156] Disgusted, the President called in his brother and Sorensen and charged them to "pull the group together quickly." Otherwise, he said, "Delay and dissension would plague whatever decision he took."[157] But Friday morning's ExCom meeting reopened the matter. Over Sorensen's protest that a decision had been reached the night before, the air strike advocates continued to press their arguments. [158] Tempers became so heated that Sorensen resorted to an uncharacteristic invocation of his special relationship with the President, "We (are) not serving the President well."[159] Finally, Robert Kennedy flatly stated: The President could not possibly order an air strike.[160] Sorensen agreed to write the first draft of a blockade speech.[161] The air strike advocates had lost. Dean Acheson did not return to the meeting the next day, but instead, retired to his farm in Maryland.[162]

Saturday morning the group approved -- or at least acquiesced in -- Sorensen's draft of a blockade speech.[163] Saturday afternoon the National Security Council met for the first time in order to make the final decision.[164] The meeting resembled a Greek play in which powers maneuvered according to the plot which moved inexorably towards the determined outcome. McCone began with the latest photographic intelligence, a daily ritual of such solemnity that it was referred to by some as "saying grace."[165] Then the two basic tracks were presented in considerable detail. Rusk and McNamara presented the arguments for the blockade. Bundy outlined the case for the air strike. At the conclusion of the presentations, there was an awkward silence which was broken by Deputy Secretary of Defense Gilpatric, "Essentially, Mr. President, this is a choice between a limited action and unlimited action."[166] Kennedy nodded his agreement, but with reservations. Before making the decision final, he said, he wanted to talk directly with the Air Force Tactical Air Command to make certain that a truly "surgical" air strike was not feasible.[167]

At this point, the discussion turned to diplomatic moves which might accompany the announcement of the blockade. Adlai Stevenson, who had returned from New York specifically for this decisive meeting, proposed first "the demilitarization, neutralization, and guaranteed integrity of Cuba, thus giving up of Guantanamo which. . . was of little use to us, in exchange for the removal of all Soviet missiles on Cuba."[168] As an alternate or subsequent move, he suggested that

the United States offer "to withdraw our Turkish and Italian Jupiter missile bases if the Russians would withdraw their Cuban missile bases, and send U.N. inspection teams to all the foreign bases maintained on both sides to prevent their use in a surprise attack." [169] In a follow-up memo, he argued that this political program would avoid comparisons with the Suez invasion, "The offer would not sound 'soft' if properly worded," he declared. "It would sound 'wise' particularly when combined with U.S. military action." [170]

Kennedy addressed himself to both of Stevenson's proposals and rejected both. First, the United States simply could not give up Guantanamo at this point. Second, though he previously ordered withdrawal of the Jupiter missiles, the middle of a crisis was not time for concessions that could destroy the alliance by confirming European suspicions concerning our willingness to sacrifice their security to protect our interests in an area of no concern to them. Instead of taking the diplomatic defensive, the President asserted that we should press our indictment of the Soviet Union for its duplicity and threat to world peace. Lovett, McCone and others joined in a much sharper attack of Stevenson's diplomatic proposals. [171]

Interpretation of this exchange must be speculative. The President himself warned that "any historian who walks through this mine field of charges and counter-charges should proceed with some care." [172] Here, we will simply record the speculation that Kennedy -- who had requested that Stevenson return from New York for the Saturday meeting -- had in fact sacrificed Adlai to the hawks in order to allow himself to choose the moderate, golden mean. "The bitter aftertaste of that Saturday afternoon in the Oval Room stayed with him (Stevenson) until his death." [173]

On Sunday morning Kennedy met once more with the Air Force bombing experts. To them, this meeting was the Air Force's last chance. Again, General Sweeny, Commander of the Tactical Command, asserted that the Air Force could guarantee only 90 percent effectiveness in a surgical air strike. The President would have to authorize the Air Force's air strike. Kennedy listened carefully, but stayed his course. His statement at the Saturday meeting and this last minute reconsideration simply "prepared the record" in case his chosen course ran aground. [174] At least he would not be vulnerable to the charge that he had not heard the Air Force's case.

Thus, the decision which Kennedy announced to the world on Tuesday evening, October 22, emerged -- part resultant and part result, a melange of misperception, miscommunication, misinformation, bargaining, pulling, hauling, and spurring as well as the "sugar and spice and everything nice" of the more conventional accounts.

V. CONCLUSION

This essay constitutes a preliminary stage in development and support of the general argument stated at the outset. The standard frame of reference employed by foreign policy analysts in producing explanation has been raised to an explicit level. Two alternative conceptual models have been stated. When one central puzzle of the Cuban missile crisis was fished with each of the models in turn, the catches were quite different. Though the conceptual models are not exclusive, most analysts do proceed predominantly in terms of one model. Which model an analyst employs does make a difference.

At a minimum, the intended implications of the argument are two. First, formulation of alternative frames of reference and demonstration that different analysts, relying predominantly on different models, produce quite different explanations should encourage analyst's self-consciousness about the nets which he employs. The effect of these "spectacles" in sensitizing the analyst to particular aspects of what is going on -- framing the puzzle in one way rather than another, encouraging the analyst to examine the problem in terms of certain categories rather than others, directing the analyst to particular kinds of evidence, and relieving puzzlement by one procedure rather than another -- must be recognized and explored. Models II and III may suggest additional, perhaps new, facets of problems, and perspectives from which they can be viewed. Second, the argument implies a position concerning the problem of "the state of the art." While accepting the commonplace characterization of the present condition of foreign policy analysis: personalistic, non-cumulative, and occasionally insightful -- this essay rejects both the counsel of despair's justification of this condition as a consequence of the character of the enterprise, and the "new frontiersmen's" demand for a priori theorizing on the frontiers and ad hoc appropriation of "new techniques."^[175] The "state of the art" is stunted rather than bankrupt. What is required is non-casual examination of the present product. Inspection of these explanations, and articulation of the conceptual models employed in producing them, is a first step. Serious attention to the logic of explanation, and explicit formulation of the propositions relied upon in substantive studies, is a second. Separation of the various intellectual enterprises in which foreign policy analysts engage, and specification of the logic of each, is a third. Formulation of a common language and framework for self-conscious conversation about what foreign policy analysts do amounts simply to a start.

Beyond these implications, however, can anything be concluded? This essay has clearly bitten off more than it has chewed. We are left at a halfway house, built from a number of crisscrossing strands, each requiring further development, each on its way to separable conclusions. But this is typical of work in progress.

1. Articulation of conceptual models as paradigms sharpens differences and understates overlaps for the sake of expository emphasis and clarity. Each of the models must be developed more precisely. A number of variants within each model should be specified. Mixed models, e.g. combinations of I and III or II and III, must be considered.

2. Each of the models is partial. None specifies precisely what is to be explained. Each concentrates on an area of importance to that particular type of analysis, relegating other important variables to a ceteris paribus clause. Relations among the three partial models must be examined.

3. Though Models II and III contribute significantly to an understanding of the U.S. blockade, Model II should be especially powerful in explaining routine executionary activity and Model III in understanding "solutions" to issues which present many alternatives to strongly divided players. A typology of decisions and actions, some of which are more amenable to treatment in terms of one model and some to another should be developed.

4. These three models exhaust neither the dimensions on which they are arranged, nor the dimensions relevant to explanations of government behavior. Further models, for example, a cognitive model or a "shrink" model focusing on the psychological characteristics of central players should be considered.[176]

5. Government behavior is but one cluster of factors relevant to occurrences in foreign affairs. Most students of foreign policy adopt this focus. Most explanations of occurrences center on government action. Nevertheless, the dimensions of the chess board, the character of the pieces, and the rules of the game -- factors considered by international systems theorists -- constitute the context in which the chess pieces are moved. The sensitivity of models of government behavior to facts about the international system must be investigated.

6. The relevance of these three models to activities of foreign policy analysts is not limited to explanation. How the models can be applied to further activities of prediction, evaluation, and recommendation provides a challenging problem for future research.

7. Analogues of these conceptual models are employed in attempting to understand government policy in other substantive areas. Articulation of these analogues and application of them to various additional areas constitutes a "target of opportunity."

Specification of each of these strands would require a section apiece. Development of the strands would mean as many essays. The space available permits but two stark suggestions.

The three models are obviously not exclusive alternatives. An account of the blockade which drew heavily from all three would be preferred. Perhaps this entails a comprehensive model in which each

of the paradigms is but a building block. A grand synthesis would seem, however, an issue for demonstration rather than assertion. For the subject matter may not permit anything grander than separate but strong building blocks. In either case, it is possible to speculate about several pieces from which a meager, ad hoc, working synthesis might be built.

Each conceptual model can be employed to produce an explanation of "the same puzzle." But from Model I's perspective, what requires explanation is an aggregate act: the U.S. solution of its strategic problem by choosing the blockade. The Model II analyst focuses on the details of disaggregated pieces: when the missiles were discovered, how the options were defined, and how the blockade was executed. The Model III analyst centers both on the emergence of a blockade decision in the ExCom and on other elements of government behavior.

In explaining the "blockade" Model I examines the U.S. strategic calculus: the strategic problem posed by the Soviet missiles, relevant American values, and U.S. capabilities. For Models II and III this strategic problem establishes the context within which investigation proceeds. That Soviet emplacement of missiles in Cuba posed a strategic problem which created a high probability of U.S. reaction is the ballpark for all three models. Given U.S. values and capabilities, the probability of a strong reaction, e.g., invasion, air strike, or blockade, was considerable. But the question for Models II and III is not: why a strong reaction to the strategic problem? Rather, given U.S. values and capabilities which created a high probability of strong reaction (once the U.S. became aware of the problem), these two models ask: why did this blockade emerge?

Model II emphasizes organizational constraints in choice and organizational routines in implementation. Organizational processes which produced awareness of the problem on October 14 (rather than two weeks earlier or later), organizational routines which defined the alternatives, and organizational procedures which executed the blockade overshadow the "choice" which the unified group of leaders contributed within these constraints.

Model III accents the active games of individual players within the leadership group. Bargaining among players who shared power but saw separate problems yielded discovery of the missiles on a certain date in a special context, a definition of the problem which demanded strong action, a coalition of Presidential intimates set on averting holocaust, failure to probe a military estimate, and consequently a blockade. In the absence of a number of particular facts about players and games, the outcome would have been different. For example, had Cuba II occurred at the time of Cuba I (April, 1961) Robert Kennedy and Sorensen would not have been members of the critical national security policy game, the military chiefs would have had more chips, and an air strike would most probably have emerged.

How these three models might be employed in activities beyond explanation can be suggested by generating predictions in terms of each. Strategic surrender is an important problem of international relations and diplomatic history. War termination is a new, developing area of the strategic literature. Both of these interests lead scholars to address a central question: Why do nations surrender when? Whether implicit in explanations or more explicit in analysis, both diplomatic historians and strategists rely upon propositions which can be turned forward to produce predictions. Thus at the risk of being timely -- and in error -- the present situation offers an interesting test case: Why will North Vietnam surrender when?[177]

In a nutshell, analysis according to Model I asserts: nations quit when costs outweigh the benefits. North Vietnam will surrender when she realizes "that continued fighting can only generate additional costs without hope of compensating gains, this expectation being largely the consequence of the previous application of force by the dominant side." [178] U.S. actions can increase or decrease Hanoi's strategic costs. Bombing North Vietnam increases the pain and thus increases the probability of surrender.

This proposition and prediction is not without meaning. That -- "other things being equal" -- nations are more likely to surrender when the strategic cost-benefit balance is negative, is true. Nations rarely surrender when they are winning. The proposition specifies a range within which nations surrender. But over this broad range, the relevant question is: what accounts for the timing of surrender?

Models II and III focus upon the government machine through which this fact about the "international strategic marketplace" must be filtered to produce a surrender. These analysts are considerably less sanguine about the possibility of surrender at the point that the cost-benefit calculus turns negative. Never in history (i.e. in none of the five cases which I have examined) have nations surrendered at that point. Surrender occurs sometime thereafter. When, depends on processes of organizations and politics of players within these governments -- as they are affected by the opposing government. Moreover, the effects of the victorious power's action upon the surrendering nation cannot be adequately summarized as increasing or decreasing strategic costs. Imposing additional costs by bombing a nation may increase the probability of surrender. But it may reduce it. An appreciation of the impact of the acts of one nation upon another thus requires some understanding of the machine which is being influenced. For more precise prediction, Models II and III require considerably more information about the organizations and politics of North Vietnam than is publicly available. On the basis of the limited public information, however, these models can be suggestive.

Model II examines two sub-problems. First, to have lost is not sufficient. The government must know that the strategic cost-benefit calculus is negative. But neither the categories, nor the indicators,

of strategic costs and benefits are clear. And the sources of information about both are organizations whose parochial priorities and perceptions do not facilitate accurate information or estimation. Military evaluation of military performance, military estimates of factors like "enemy morale," and military predictions concerning when "the tide will turn" or "the corner will have been turned" are markedly distorted. In cases of highly de-centralized guerrilla operations, like Vietnam, these problems are exacerbated. Thus strategic costs will be under-estimated. Only highly visible costs can have direct impact on leaders without being filtered through organizational channels.

Second, since organizations define the details of options and execute actions, surrender (and negotiation) is likely to entail considerable bungling in the early stages. No organization can define options or prepare programs for this treasonous act. Thus, early overtures will be uncoordinated with the acts of other organizations, e.g., the fighting forces, creating contradictory "signals" to the victor.

Model III suggests that surrender will not come at the point that strategic costs outweigh benefits, but that it will not wait until the leadership group concludes that the war is lost. Rather the problem is better understood in terms of four additional propositions. First, strong advocates of the war effort, whose careers are closely identified with the war, rarely come to conclude that costs outweigh benefits. Second, quite often from the outset of a war, a number of members of the government (particularly those whose responsibilities sensitize them to problems other than war, e.g., economic planners or intelligence experts), are convinced that the war effort is futile. Third, surrender is likely to come as the result of a political shift which enhances the effective power of the latter group (and adds swing members to it). Fourth, the course of the war, particularly actions of the victor, can influence the advantages and disadvantages of players in the loser's government. Thus, North Vietnam will surrender not when its leaders have a change of heart, but when Hanoi has a change of leaders (or a change of effective power within the central circle). How U.S. bombing (or pause), threats, promises, or action in the South affect the game in Hanoi is subtle but nonetheless crucial.

That these three models could be applied to the surrender of governments other than North Vietnam should be obvious. But that exercise is left for the reader.

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171. Able, Missile Crisis, 95.
172. Sorensen, Kennedy, 695.
173. Able, Missile Crisis, 90.
174. Ibid., 100-1.
175. Thus my position is quite distinct from both poles in the recent "great debate" concerning international relations. While many "traditionalists" of the sort Kaplan attacks adopt the first posture and many "scientists" of the sort attacked by Bull adopt the second, this third posture is relatively neutral with respect to whatever is in substantive dispute. See H. Bull, "International Theory: The Case for a Classical Approach," World Politics, April, 1966; M. Kaplan, "The New Great Debate: Traditionalism vs. Science in International Relations," World Politics, October, 1966.
176. John Steinbrunner has begun to develop a cognitive model. See "The MLF," Ph.D. dissertation, MIT, 1968.
177. This discussion is heavily indebted to Ernest R. May.
178. Snyder, R., Deterrence and Defense, 11.